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CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE SHADOW
OF DOCTRINE:  THE PRESIDENT’S
NON-ENFORCEMENT POWER
DAVID BARRON*
I
INTRODUCTION
May a President refuse, on constitutional grounds, to enforce a statute that
requires the firing of all HIV-positive military personnel?  May a President rely
upon the Fifth Amendment to bar federal prosecutors from using unwarned
statements notwithstanding a federal statute that expressly validates their use?
May a President invoke a constitutional norm of equality to decline to enforce a
provision requiring the adoption of differential business regulations for similar
professions that he “knows” to be the product of nothing more than special in-
terest dealing?
There is a tendency among those sympathetic to the Supreme Court’s rights-
protecting role to be wary of an affirmative answer to such questions.  There is
lurking in the background a concern that the vigorous assertion of a President’s
independent authority to interpret the Constitution will be destructive of the
rule of law, a concern that once the Supreme Court’s preeminence as constitu-
tional adjudicator is called into question, judicially enforceable individual rights
will be called into doubt.  For that reason, it is perhaps not surprising that the
Clinton Administration, eager to disassociate itself from its predecessors’
grander claims to independent presidential interpretive authority,1 has ap-
proached with delicacy the question of the scope of the non-enforcement
power.
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The Clinton Administration did not, it must be said, swing so far in the other
direction that it disavowed the non-enforcement authority entirely.  It rejected
the position of those who contend that the executive’s obligation to take care
that the laws be faithfully executed deprives the President of the power to de-
cline to enforce a statute on constitutional grounds and makes the veto power
the sole means by which the President may give tangible effect to his independ-
ent constitutional views.2  Neither was the Administration willing to join, how-
ever, with those who suggest that the President’s obligation to take care that the
laws, of which the Constitution is the supreme one, be faithfully executed leaves
the President no choice but to decline to enforce a statute whenever he believes
it to be unconstitutional.3
Instead, the Clinton Administration’s Office of Legal Counsel issued an im-
portant, nuanced opinion on the scope of the non-enforcement power.  The
opinion attempts to be respectful of the Supreme Court’s “special role” in the
constitutional structure, even as it is hospitable to the exercise of the executive’s
discretion to refuse to enforce a statute on constitutional grounds.4  The opinion
attempts to perform this feat by arguing as follows.  Insofar as the President in-
tends to be a faithful constitutional actor, he may exercise the non-enforcement
power.  The power should generally be exercised, however, in a manner that
ensures that the ultimate resolution of a statute’s constitutionality will be con-
sistent with the resolution that the Supreme Court would reach if it were pre-
sented with the question in a justiciable controversy.  The President may decline
to enforce a statute, the opinion therefore concludes, when it is “probable” that
the Supreme Court would vindicate his independent constitutional judgment.5
Even then, however, the President should generally enforce statutes he believes
to be unconstitutional in order to render justiciable constitutional questions that
the exercise of the non-enforcement power would otherwise insulate from judi-
2. See e.g., Lear Siegler v. Lehman, 893 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1989) (as amended, Jan. 10, 1990) (va-
cated on other grounds); Christopher N. May, Presidential Defiance of “Unconstitutional” Laws: Reviv-
ing the Royal Prerogative, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 865 (1994); see also Dawn Johnsen, Presidential
Non-Enforcement of Constitutionally Objectionable Statutes, 63 Law & Contemp. Probs. 7, 14-16 (Win-
ter/Spring 2000) (discussing and criticizing this view).
3. See, e.g., Frank Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905 (1989); John
Harrison, The Constitutional Origins and Implications of Judicial Review, 84 U. VA. L. REV.  333
(1998); Michael Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83
GEO. L. J. 217 (1994); see also Dawn Johnsen, supra note 2, at 16-22 (discussing and criticizing this
view).
4. See Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. Off. Legal
Counsel 199, 200 (Nov. 2, 1994) ( stating that “if the president believes that the Court would sustain a
particular provision as Constitutional, the President should execute the statute. . . ”  but, if he deter-
mines it to be unconstitutional, and the Court would likely agree, he has the authority not to execute
the statute); see also May, supra note 2, at 991-93 (arguing that no non-enforcement power exists but
suggesting that if it does, it should be limited in terms similar to those set forth in the Clinton Admini-
stration opinion).
5. 18 Op. Off. Legal Counsel at 200.
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cial review.6  For in many cases, there will be no injury sufficient to support a
court challenge unless the President enforces the statute.
In her thoughtful contribution to this symposium, Professor Johnsen elabo-
rates on this court-centered approach to presidential non-enforcement.7 She
agrees that a President should generally enforce statutes that he believes to be
unconstitutional.  She adopts this view in significant respects because of the im-
portance of ensuring that constitutional disputes between the branches are
made justiciable.  She argues, however, that the executive should then submit a
brief in the ensuing litigation that lays out the executive’s constitutional con-
cerns while leaving it to Congress to provide the case in defense.  It is in such
briefs, she suggests, that the President may set forth his independent constitu-
tional judgment, and it is from such briefs that the judiciary will have the benefit
of the independent constitutional views of another branch.8  This approach will
ensure that the Court will perform its review of the statute’s constitutionality
with the benefit of a full articulation of the constitutional views of the political
branches.  This circumstance will enhance the Court’s resolution of constitu-
tional meaning.9
This article challenges the court-centered approach to the scope of the
President’s non-enforcement power.  It does so less because such an approach
circumscribes executive authority than because, in doing so, such an approach
unduly circumscribes the possible scope of constitutional limitations.  In making
this argument, this article emphasizes that constitutional meaning is shaped by,
and should be shaped by, the institutional location of the interpreter.  Such an
emphasis makes it possible to critique the court-centered approach without
adopting either of the more categorical responses to the non-enforcement di-
lemma identified above.  Such an emphasis also makes it possible to discuss
more generally the connection between constitutional structure and constitu-
tional rights-enforcement that the court-centered conception of constitutional-
ism obscures.
The chief merits of the court-centered approach inhere in its attempt to
situate constitutional interpretation within an institutional context and its con-
comitant rejection of the categorical notion that the President’s non-
enforcement power follows simply from his position as the chief executive offi-
cer.  The court-centered approach points out that any such notion would permit
6. See id. at 201.  The opinion goes on to explain that the President may have greater non-
enforcement authority with respect to provisions that are objectionable because they intrude on the
President’s own constitutional powers, in part because such provisions may become justiciable only if
they are disregarded.  See id.  It notes as well that although “some legislative encroachments on execu-
tive authority . . . will not be justiciable or are for other reasons unlikely to be resolved in court,” the
President has the authority to decline to enforce such provisions.  Id.
7. See generally Johnsen, supra note 2.
8. See id. at 49-50.
9. See id.  Professor Johnsen also explains, however, that there may be circumstances when the
President should exercise his non-enforcement power even if doing so would deprive the Court of a
constitutional case.  She takes such instances to be exceptions to the general rule of cases that implicate
the non-enforcement power.  See id. at 12-13.
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constitutional interpretation to be seized by an interpreter with the institutional
characteristics of the executive.  Such a categorical approach would preclude
other interpreters with distinct characteristics of their own (the Court and the
Congress) from giving shape to constitutional meaning.
The chief flaw of the court-centered approach, however, inheres in its de-
scriptively problematic and structurally troubling premise concerning the Su-
preme Court’s special role in determining constitutional meaning.  That premise
ignores the degree to which the Supreme Court’s own institutional characteris-
tics shape its interpretations.  Attention to this shaping effect undermines the
notion that the Court renders final resolutions of the constitutional validity of
governmental conduct when it upholds statutes against private challenges.  The
Court should be understood to refrain from offering such final resolutions be-
cause the political branches are themselves responsible for discerning constitu-
tional limitations on their own conduct that no private party may be positioned
fully to discern.  For that reason, it is problematic to constrain the scope of the
President’s non-enforcement power in the name of preserving the judiciary’s
authority to declare the meaning of the Constitution.  Such a constraint unduly
circumscribes the potential scope of constitutional limitations to those capable
of discernment by the Court.
To explore this line of thinking, this article contends that a President, not-
withstanding that he considers himself bound by the Supreme Court’s constitu-
tional interpretations, should resolve three distinct questions in determining
whether he may faithfully decline to enforce a statute by virtue of its unconsti-
tutionality.  The three questions are: (1) Is the President’s substantive constitu-
tional concern with the statute one that arises from a reasoning process that,
under current doctrine, the courts would be likely to review independently if
the case were justiciable? (2) Does the substantive constitutional concern with
the statute arise from a reasoning process that the President, as opposed to the
Congress, would be better equipped, as a matter of constitutional structure, to
perform?  And, finally, (3) is the reasoning process that the President would
employ to resolve the second question one that the President is better posi-
tioned to perform, again taking current doctrine as a constraining guide, than
either the courts or the Congress?10
The article examines these three questions in connection with the three non-
enforcement cases set forth at the outset.  Each of the three cases is easily re-
solved if the task is to ensure that the Supreme Court has an opportunity to re-
solve the substantive constitutional question in a case in which the President
may then offer his own constitutional views to the Court.  In each instance, the
10. Professor Johnsen acknowledges the basic logic of the objection that I wish to make.  See John-
sen supra note 2, at 38-43.  She notes that “[t]he courts at times recognize the special competencies of
the political branches by deferring to their constitutional determinations in their areas of expertise and
even declining to decide certain issues, for example, under the political question doctrine.”  Id. at 42-43.
Nonetheless, Professor Johnsen argues that justiciability remain a central constraint in order to pre-
serve debate through the judicial process, id., and to ensure “respect . . . [for] the constitutionally pre-
scribed lawmaking process.”  Id. at 43 n.145.
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President should exercise his enforcement power in order to occasion a justici-
able controversy that the Court may resolve.  The analysis becomes more com-
plicated, however, if we abandon the notion that a proper respect for the Su-
preme Court’s special role in constitutional interpretation entails a conclusion
that the Supreme Court is the preferable institution for establishing the outer
bounds of constitutional limitations on governmental action.
With that assumption abandoned, it becomes clear, as Parts II and III show,
that the question in all three of the non-enforcement cases set forth above re-
duces to whether the President or the Congress possesses greater relative inter-
pretive authority over the type of constitutional question at issue.  That second-
order, structural question is distinct from the substantive one that the Court
would ordinarily be called upon to resolve in a case involving a constitutional
challenge to a statute.  Part IV then suggests a framework for resolving that in-
ter-branch dispute over relative interpretive authority in a manner that roughly
tracks the traditional separation of powers framework for allocating decision-
making authority between the political branches.  For example, the President
has greater independent interpretive authority over questions that concern his
core executive responsibilities, such as performing his duties as commander-in-
chief, than he does over questions that concern mere administration, such as the
carrying out of general economic regulation.11
Whether the suggested structural framework for resolving such inter-branch
disputes is persuasive is ultimately of secondary importance.  The key point is
that the constitutional dispute that must be resolved in a non-enforcement case
often concerns a structural question of relative interpretive power between the
legislative and executive branches rather than a substantive question of “cor-
rect” constitutional meaning.  A recognition of this point undermines the
seemingly appealing contention that underlies the court-centered approach to
non-enforcement.  For even if one grants the Court’s special role in adjudicating
the rights of private parties challenging the constitutionality of governmental
action, it is not at all clear that we “need” the Court to resolve disputes between
the political branches over their relative interpretive authority.  Or, at least, as
Part V explains, it is not at all clear that we “need” the Court to resolve such
disputes until the branches party to them have made clear their desire for the
Court’s assistance.  The President may, of course, seek such assistance by en-
forcing a statute and thereby creating a justiciable controversy.  If he concludes
that such assistance is not needed, however, Congress may seek such assistance
through the passage of legislation that would confer causes of action upon those
persons who may be deprived of the benefits of the legislation that the Presi-
dent has chosen on constitutional grounds not to enforce.  In this way, the
“need” for judicial assistance should be understood as less an a priori constraint
11. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-35 (Jackson, J., concurring);
Lawrence Lessig and Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 46-47
(1994).
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on the President’s non-enforcement power than a judgment to be made by the
political branches.
II
THE DEFERENTIAL CHARACTER OF CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE
The argument for a court-centered approach to the exercise of the presiden-
tial non-enforcement power rests on a mix of procedural and substantive con-
tentions about constitutionalism.  The procedural contention is that there will
be unremitting and wasteful inter-branch contentiousness in the absence of a fi-
nal, authoritative arbiter of constitutional meaning.  The substantive argument
is that, all things considered, it is preferable to assign to the Supreme Court the
role of ultimate arbiter given the match between constitutionalism’s generally
anti-majoritarian bent and the Court’s unique insulation from majoritarian
pressures.12
If this defense of primary judicial authority to determine constitutional
meaning were sound, then it would seem to follow inexorably that a President’s
non-enforcement power should be exercised only in order to ensure that the
Supreme Court will have an opportunity to resolve the constitutionality of the
statute at issue.  It would be odd, after all, to conclude that, on the one hand,
the constitutional structure is properly understood to privilege the interpretive
products of one institution, the Supreme Court, but that, on the other, that
same structure permits a distinct institution, the President, to exercise its inter-
pretive authority in a manner that would exclude the properly privileged deci-
sionmaker from weighing in.
The logic of the argument would seem to be sufficiently airtight as to give
rise to a line of objection far more basic than the one that will be set forth here.
The argument would seem to demand a challenge to the initial premise that Su-
preme Court decisions regarding constitutional meaning should be privileged
over the decisions of the other branches in any circumstance, let alone the spe-
cial circumstance of the President’s refusal to enforce a statute on constitutional
grounds.  An objection of this kind would raise deep questions of constitutional
structure.  It would bring to the fore what has been termed the Merryman
problem.  This problem concerns the degree to which the President should be
bound to adhere to a judicial judgment that a favored course of governmental
action would be unconstitutional.13
12. See Presidential Authority, 18 Op. Off. Legal Counsel, at 200 (“The Supreme Court plays a spe-
cial role in resolving disputes about the constitutionality of enactments.”); Larry Alexander & Freder-
ick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1362 n.12 (1997)
(emphasizing the settlement function and apparently treating equivalently the duty to obey judicial de-
cisions upholding statutes and those invalidating them); May, supra note 2, at 991-93.
13. See Ex Parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487) (discussing President
Lincoln’s refusal to obey an order issuing a writ of habeas corpus); see Paulsen, supra note 3, at 278-82
(defending Lincoln’s action and the broader authority of the President to disregard judicial judgments
that governmental conduct is unconstitutional).
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This far more basic objection will seem powerful to some.  It will respond to
the sense that the court-centered argument reveals that court-centrism defines
our constitutional thinking so completely as to infect even discussions of how
non-judicial institutions may perform their interpretive responsibilities.  Such
an objection may seem to others to reflect only naiveté about how political
power would likely be exercised in the absence of judicial review.  It will seem
to constitute a weak response to plausible contentions about the consequences
of giving greater authority to the President than the court-centered approach
would allow.  For present purposes, however, it is unnecessary to pursue this
more basic line of objection.  The logic of the argument on behalf of the court-
centered approach to the exercise of the non-enforcement power need not be
met so directly in order to be questioned.
Imagine, then, that a President is faced with a statute that he believes to be
unconstitutional.  The President should not begin his inquiry by asking whether
his decision to decline to enforce the statute will deprive the Court of a justici-
able case.  He should instead ask whether the nature of the judgment that has
led him to conclude that the statute is unconstitutional is one that a court would
be likely to evaluate independently in a justiciable case.  If he pursues this latter
line of inquiry first, he will begin to see the problems that arise from focusing at
the outset on whether a justiciable case will result from a decision not to en-
force.
A President’s judgment of a statute’s unconstitutionality will likely rest on a
mix of interdependent sub-judgments.  Some will concern proper interpreta-
tions of court precedent, text, or history.  Some will concern quasi-empirical de-
terminations or normative evaluations of facts and likely results on which court
precedents rest.14  Once the President focuses on the types of sub-judgments
that have led him to conclude that the statute is unconstitutional, he will then
have to consider the degree to which the relevant doctrine indicates that the
Court would actually independently review any or all of these sub-judgments in
a justiciable case challenging the statute’s constitutionality.  For if the Court
would not undertake an independent review of these sub-judgments even in a
justiciable case, then it is not at all clear that the interest in ensuring justiciabil-
ity should operate to constrain the President’s exercise of the non-enforcement
power.
In a limited number of cases, the President may not need to think very hard
on the question whether the Court would engage in independent review.  The
constitutional issue will, under the doctrine, be a political question or otherwise
non-justiciable.  It will be obvious in these instances that the Court will not have
the occasion to rule on a case concerning the statute’s constitutionality no mat-
ter what the President does.  In such circumstances, the effect that non-
enforcement would have on justiciability obviously cannot be a determining fac-
tor for the President.  There is simply no way that the President can make justi-
14. See David L. Faigman, “Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding”: Exploring the Empirical
Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 543-44 (1991).
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ciable the dispute over the statute’s constitutionality.  In such cases, those who
adopt the court-centered approach appear to be willing to concede that the
President is not, by reason of the non-justiciable nature of the constitutional
dispute, necessarily precluded from rendering a constitutional judgment re-
garding the statute’s legality.  Such a position would unduly privilege the consti-
tutional views of the Congress over questions that are political, but not neces-
sarily congressional.  Nevertheless, it is not clear from the executive branch’s
writings how the President is to go about exercising his non-enforcement power
in such circumstances.
For present purposes, it is important to see that these plainly political or
otherwise nonjusticiable questions, in the sense that they do not admit of a jus-
ticiable resolution of the underlying, substantive constitutional questions, are
not outliers.  Even in cases that will clearly be justiciable if the President
chooses to enforce the statute, the President is still likely to discover that the
relevant doctrine is everywhere embedded with rules and tests that cast serious
doubt as to whether the precise judgment that has led him to conclude that the
statute is unconstitutional will be one that the court will actually independently
review when the case comes before it.  As a result, the President should have lit-
tle reason to take solace in the possibility that a statute he believes to be uncon-
stitutional, but nonetheless has enforced, might still be subject to private chal-
lenge before a court of law.  The subsequent court challenge is likely to be
decided by courts acting pursuant to doctrines and tests that are designed to en-
sure that judges need not interrogate the congressional conclusion that a statute
is constitutional with anything approximating the rigor that the President him-
self felt not only entitled, but compelled, to apply.
Without belaboring the point, “[i]dentifying the ‘meaning’ of the Constitu-
tion is not the Court’s only function.  A crucial mission of the Court is to im-
plement the Constitution successfully.  In service of this mission, the Court of-
ten must craft doctrine that is driven by the Constitution, but does not reflect
the Constitution’s meaning precisely.”15  Concerns about institutional role, insti-
tutional competence, and even problems of forging agreement among a multi-
member body may all result in a doctrine that not even the Court believes to
represent a comprehensive, and thus preclusive, rendering of the meaning of
the Constitution.  The doctrine instead represents simply an effort at implemen-
tation of the Constitution by a court, positioned as it is, and structured as it is.16
That is not to say that the Supreme Court imagines the doctrine that it cre-
ates to be merely suggestive to the political branches.  The doctrine is quite
clearly intended to delimit the permissible scope of governmental action, and
therefore to preclude governmental actors from doing certain things that they
would wish to do.  In this respect, the Court’s doctrine does serve to deem cer-
tain governmental acts “unconstitutional” in the sense that the Court’s judg-
15. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 57
(1997).
16. See id.
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ment amounts to a determination that it would be unlawful under the Constitu-
tion for those acts to be undertaken.  Here, however, we are not concerned with
the question of the role that Supreme Court doctrine should play in constrain-
ing a governmental actor’s determination that a certain governmental measure
is constitutional.  That would be the Merryman issue.  We are concerned instead
with the role that Supreme Court doctrine should play in constraining a gov-
ernmental actor’s determination that a certain governmental measure is uncon-
stitutional.  Even if the President were to consider himself bound to obey a ju-
dicial determination that a statute is unconstitutional, in other words, it would
not follow that he should understand himself to be similarly bound by a judicial
determination that a statute is constitutional.
Simply put, Supreme Court doctrine will often fail to provide definitive
guidance as to what a President’s obligations are to obey a decision upholding
the constitutionality of a statute.  The Supreme Court crafts its doctrine inter-
preting constitutional meaning through  “screens of deference.”17  Its judgments
upholding statutes need not be understood, therefore, to amount to determina-
tions that these legal products are constitutional in some comprehensive or pre-
clusive sense.  Instead, court judgments often may be understood to resolve
only that a private party is not in a position to have a court substitute its judg-
ment as to the constitutionality of a governmental action for that of the political
branches of the government.
The claim here, then, is not one about the necessary indeterminacy of legal
meaning in a general sense.  Quite the opposite.  The claim is that Supreme
Court doctrine is quite intelligible. What emerges from close consideration is a
message that the Court’s decision to uphold a statute against constitutional
challenge does not constitute a final determination that would preclude other
institutional actors, unburdened as they are by equivalent obligations of defer-
ence, from reaching a contrary conclusion.  Or, at least, that is a message that a
President could certainly divine from a doctrine that is so clearly predicated on
demands of deference to political institutions.
If Supreme Court doctrine is understood in this manner, and particularly if
it is understood that the Supreme Court understands its doctrine in this manner,
then it will often be the case that constitutional doctrine will not of its own force
provide clear direction to the President as to how he should respond to a statute
he believes to be unconstitutional.  The chief executive is likely to find that the
doctrine that is supposed to guide him is everywhere comprised of tests and
rules that compensate for or reflect the Court’s own conception of the limita-
tions of its decisional capacities.  The President is likely to find everywhere in
the doctrine, in other words, what might quite rightly be understood as invita-
tions to the political branches to make decisions on their own, to do the kind of
17. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Province and Duty of the Political Departments, 65 U. CHI. L.
REV. 365, 383 (1998).
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implementation of constitutional meaning that the Court will not itself per-
form.18
The most deferential form of the rational basis test, for example, serves as a
mechanism by which the Court distinguishes between legitimate, and therefore
constitutional legislation, and illegitimate, and therefore unconstitutional legis-
lation.19  The test asks whether there is a conceivable, rational basis on which
the legislature could have found the statute to be legitimate.20  When the Court
upholds a statute under the rational basis test, it need not be understood to
have settled comprehensively that a particular piece of legislation is “legiti-
mate,” even though “illegitimate” legislation would quite clearly be unconstitu-
tional.  The test may rather operate to ensure only that, in the face of a private
challenge, it would be rational for the government to conclude that such a pol-
icy would be legitimate.  The ultimate constitutional test of legitimacy is not
really met even when a statute is upheld.  That is so precisely because the ra-
tional basis test serves to ensure that it need not be met in order for a statute to
survive a court challenge brought by a private party.
The rational basis test, it is important to emphasize, is but the most obvious
one of many similarly deferential rules that pervade modern doctrine.  These
rules and tests do not all take the form of generous requirements of deference
to the political branches.  Many of them, such as the rational basis test, take this
form.  Other rules, however, may take the form of what have been termed pro-
phylactic rules.  In the implementation of constitutional meaning the Court may
craft rules that do not actually try to resolve what the Constitution of its own
force necessarily requires, but rather are designed to “protect the underlying
constitutional values”21 through a form of what may be termed overprotection.22
The classic example of such a prophylactic rule is the requirement of warn-
ings set forth in Miranda v. Arizona.23  The Court did not contend this precise
requirement was necessarily constitutionally ordained.  It thought instead that
this requirement was both judicially practicable to enunciate and necessary in
the absence of some other equally effective, politically crafted deterrent against
18. This account of the doctrine is drawn from LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 949 n.121 (3d ed., 1999); Fallon, supra note 15, at 58; Michael W. McConnell, Comment, Institu-
tions and Interpretations: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 156 (1997);
Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of Constitution Law, 88 NW. U.
L. REV. 410 (1993) [hereinafter Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes]; Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure:
The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1213-20 (1978);
David Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190 (1988).  This conception of
constitutionalism may be traced back to James B. Thayer, The Origin of and Scope of the American
Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893), although its emphasis is quite distinct.
See Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes, supra, at 412-14 (discussing this connection).
19. LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1440 (2d ed. 1988).
20.  Id. at 1443-46.
21.  Michael C. Dorf, Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 70
(1998).
22.  See generally Strauss, supra note 18 (arguing that prophylactic rules are a central and necessary
feature of constitutional law).
23. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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coercive police practices.24  Prophylactic rules are often self-consciously crafted,
as the Miranda warnings were, with the idea that they are not the last word on
constitutional meaning.  In crafting such rules, the Court does not necessarily
intend to strip political institutions of any power to substitute for them (indeed,
it may implore political institutions to offer substitutions).  Nor should it be un-
derstood to preclude political institutions from concluding that the Constitution
compels that such rules be made even more stringent.25
In addition to rules of deference and prophylaxis, there are intermediate
rules, which are at once deferential and overprotective.  Examples would be the
various doctrinal tests that are intended to smoke out impermissible legislative
motives.  Some of these tests appear on their face to be quite non-deferential,
but close inspection reveals them to be the product of the demands of deference
as well.  These rules make up for the judiciary’s own disinclination to police the
motives of political actors, a disinclination that itself arises out of deference to
the political branches.26  Interestingly, however, the very deference that keeps
the Court from engaging in too deep an inquiry into “actual” legislative motiva-
tion produces a doctrine that is in some sense less deferential to legislators.
Legislative motives can be deemed impermissible on the basis of doctrinal tests
that are intended to evaluate motive without engaging in the kind of searching
inquiry that might reveal the motive to have been pure.  Nevertheless, while
these tests of motive may rule out certain types of governmental action as
impermissibly motivated, even if in some Platonic sense they are not, they do
not purport to discern comprehensively all such impermissibly motivated gov-
ernmental action.  They, too, are a doctrinal embodiment of the Court’s perva-
sively deferential stance.  They do not operate conclusively to deem govern-
mental motives to be pure—even in cases in which the Court cannot say with
sufficient confidence that the motives in question were impure.
What these various rules have in common is that, in operation, they serve to
limit the inquiries that the Court will undertake to resolve a constitutional dis-
pute in a case brought by a private party.  These rules do not, of course, confer
complete freedom to the political branches.  Nor are they intended to do so.
Neither are they intended, however, to ensure that every constitutional case
produces a judgment as to what the right construction of the Constitution
isinsofar as rightness would be thought to have meaning as a concept di-
vorced from the self-acknowledged institutional limitations from which the
Court consciously constructs its doctrine.  The combined effect of these rules is
to leave substantial room for political actors to determine for themselves that a
given course of conduct would be unconstitutional.
24. See Strauss, supra note 18, at 190-97; see also Henry B. Monaghan Foreword: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20-26 (1975) (discussing Miranda as a prophylactic rule).
25. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 267, 403 (1998) (discussing the experimental character of Miranda).
26. See Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 491-505 (1996).
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The effect of doctrine’s pervasively deferential character is to free political
actors to give a fuller scope to constitutional limitations than could the Court,
burdened as it is by the self-imposed demands of deference to political actors.
The Court’s doctrine embodies the screen of deference through which the
Court evaluates the constitutionality of governmental action, then, not only in
its willingness to uphold legislation against private challenge by applying vari-
ous forms of relatively relaxed review.  It embodies that deferential stance as
well in its invitation to the political branches to which it defers to perform their
interpretive responsibilities unburdened by the obligations that perceived de-
mands of deference impose upon judges.
Before proceeding further, it is important to pause to acknowledge the lim-
its of this claim.  In some not insignificant number of cases, the constitutional
judgment to be made will concern a matter that under current doctrine is quite
clearly resolved on the basis of an interpretation of history, text, or prior prece-
dent.  The doctrine in such cases seems to exclude extrinsic considerations of
the kind that a political actor such as the President would be institutionally posi-
tioned to challenge.  Or, at least, in such cases, the President’s disagreement
with the Court’s precedents will turn only on a disagreement with the doctrine’s
conclusion concerning the meaning of text, precedent, or history, rather than
any doctrinally embedded evaluative or empirical judgment with which he is in
disagreement.
In cases of this type, where the disagreement concerns a dispute over what
might be termed “formal” meaning, the President’s interpretive freedom is at its
nadir.  It is difficult to see how the President’s institutional position would bet-
ter equip him than the Court to make judgments of this type.27  It is important to
see, however, that the instances in which questions of constitutional meaning
turn on such formal legal considerations are fewer than the court-centered ap-
proach presumes.  Indeed, it is a vice of the court-centered approach to non-
enforcement that it tends to encourage the President to perceive the doctrinal
resolution of constitutional meaning as turning on such formal legal considera-
tions, rather than on the more practical judgments that his own institutional po-
sition well suits him to make.28
27. The analogy here is to the Court’s doctrine regarding deference to executive branch interpreta-
tion of statutes, in which the Court will defer to an agency interpretation unless Congress has spoken to
the precise question at issue.  See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984).
28. To be sure, the Court’s recent decisions interpreting Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
do appear to be determining not only what is unconstitutional but also what is constitutional, and to be
doing so in a way that is intended to preclude political actors from reaching contrary conclusions on
that latter score.  In both City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), and Florida Prepaid Postsecon-
dary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999), for example, the Court
concluded that it would be unconstitutional for Congress to exercise its Section 5 power under the
Fourteenth Amendment because such exercises sought to prohibit state conduct that the Court had
deemed “constitutional.”  The consequence of this judgment, in City of Boerne, was to render unconsti-
tutional the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which Congress enacted in order to enforce the Free
Exercise Clause as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment.  In College Savings Bank, the conse-
quence of this judgment was to render unconstitutional the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Rem-
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It should be acknowledged that there is one area of doctrine in which the
Court’s decision to uphold legislation is clearly intended to be preclusive of the
President’s interpretive authority.  All judicial resolutions on the merits of sepa-
ration of powers cases involving the President, as well as all judicial resolutions
on the merits of claims of executive privilege or immunity, have this preclusive
character.  In upholding a statute that arguably intrudes on executive authority,
such as the statute at issue in Morrison v. Olson,29 or rejecting a claim of execu-
tive privilege, as in United States v. Nixon,30 the Court is necessarily establishing
the degree to which the President may deem actions by a competing institu-
tional actor to be unconstitutional—and it is resolving the issue on this score
against the President.
For now, it suffices to note that outside this special context, the Court’s
judgments upholding federal legislation need not be understood to address the
scope of the President’s authority to interpret the Constitution in a manner that
would render governmental action unconstitutional.  These judgments are in-
stead the products of a doctrine that is designed to evaluate the freedom of ac-
tion of the federal government as such.  They do not address the relative consti-
tutional interpretive authority of the political branches of the federal
government with respect to each other.
The institutional limitations that inspire the Court to create a doctrine that
has this character (or that inspire a President to read the doctrine so as to give it
this character) need not rest on the ground that the Court is institutionally in-
edy Clarification Act, which Congress enacted in order enforce the Due Process Clause.  These cases
make it clear that the Court is not beyond enunciating a preclusive constitutional doctrine.  If the Court
were to hold that the President did not possess a power to decline to enforce on constitutional grounds
a statute that it had upheld against private challenge, nothing in the account given here would provide a
direct line of argument in favor of the President’s assertion of non-enforcement power notwithstanding
a judicial precedent directly denying that power’s existence.  The account offered here does suggest,
however, that the Court’s doctrine generally tilts very much against preclusion.
Indeed, it is not clear that even the recent Section 5 cases deem certain conduct to be constitutional
in a sense that would have preclusive force against political actors generally.  In City of Boerne, the
Court purported to rest its decision not only on a construction of the word “enforce” in Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, but also on more general notions of the distinction between the role of the
Court as constitutional interpreter and the role of the Congress as legislative actor.  See City of Boerne,
521 U.S. at 536.  The citations to Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), and the concerns about the
legislature intruding upon the Court’s sphere of action, however, are absent from the more recent deci-
sion in College Savings Bank, which couches its holding almost entirely on a relatively strict construc-
tion of the meaning and inherent limitations in the word “enforce.”  119 S. Ct. at 2205.  Those limita-
tions seem to emanate more from concerns of federalism, and the need to place limitations on the
legislative authority of the federal government to intrude on state affairs, than on any more abstract
assertions about the exclusive, and thus preclusive, authority of the Court to divine constitutional limi-
tations.  See College Savings Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2206-10.  In this respect, the recent Section 5 cases may
comport with the account of doctrine offered above.  They do less to vest the divination of constitu-
tional meaning in the federal courts than to wrest its divination from Congress for the benefit of the
States.  To read them more broadly is not to demonstrate one’s respect for the Court.  It would instead
be to take a position with respect to constitutional structure, and the process by which constitutional
limitations may take shape, that may not even be the Court’s own.
29. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
30. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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competent in the bureaucratic sense to take on a more expansive interpretive
role.  It is not as if the Court must settle on these non-preclusive doctrines
solely because it lacks the technical capability to do the evaluative work that its
doctrinal tests avoid.  Maybe the Court could do such evaluative work and
maybe it could not.  Instead, the Court may be understood to opt for, and
should be encouraged to opt for, tests that have this non-preclusive character
because of the structural costs that would attend the judicial performance of
such work.
These costs go beyond what have been termed administrative costs or error
costs—namely, the costs associated with the amount of time it would take to do
the additional work or the possibility that erroneous judgments would be made
if the work were undertaken.31  The costs are of a more normative kind—costs
associated with the harm that might be done to the constitutional structure, and
the quality of democratic participation under it, if a court attempted to resolve
matters that might otherwise be left to the political branches to resolve.  One
such cost might be that the political branches would be less likely to perceive
their own obligations to share in the implementation of the Constitution if the
Court attempted to resolve more through its doctrine.32  Another might be that
more comprehensive judicial intervention would give a false impression as to
the nature of constitutional meaning.  It would suggest that there is a single
right answer to be divined, rather than merely a meaning to be given practical
effect through the actions of one or another of the branches of government.  A
third cost would be that the remedial limitations of a court might artificially
limit the range of responses that could be taken to respond to constitutional
concerns.33
The structural costs of an expanded judicial role are familiarly employed in
justifying a deferential judicial stance in the face of a private challenge to a stat-
ute’s constitutionality.  They merit attention here for a different reason.  They
suggest that a President would be mistaken to read the doctrine as simply a plea
to provide the Court with more information in order to ensure that its constitu-
tional judgment will be “more” informed and therefore that its resolution will
be “more” accurate.  The doctrine may be better read as an invitation for the
political branches to act on their own determinations regarding the unconstitu-
tionality of certain governmental action.34
31. See Strauss, supra note 18, at 205.
32. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT 27-28 (1999); SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 4, 259-60 (1988).
33. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations
of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1247-58 (1967) (making this point in connection
with the scope of the Takings Clause).
34. The classic statement of this position may be found in Thayer’s article elucidating the distinc-
tion between a legislator and a judge in interpreting the Constitution.
[O]ne who is a member of a legislature may vote against a measure as being,
in his judgment, unconstitutional; and, being subsequently placed on the
bench, when this measure, having been passed by the legislature in spite of
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If the preceding account of the doctrine is persuasive, then it should begin to
undermine the argument that the President should exercise his non-
enforcement authority sparingly, and generally only if doing so would not de-
prive the Court of jurisdiction.  Presidential enforcement of the statute often
would, it is true, permit the ensuing constitutional dispute to reach the courts.
By contrast, presidential non-enforcement often would not.  Even if the Presi-
dent enforces the statute, however, the question would then arise as to what the
Court would do with a dispute over the statute’s constitutionality once it came
before it.  That question is unfortunately one that the Court-centered approach
to non-enforcement encourages us to overlook.
Attention to that question reveals that the Court might still decline to wres-
tle with the particular judgment that occasioned the President’s constitutional
conviction.  In such circumstances, it is not clear what would be gained for con-
stitutionalism by ensuring, through presidential enforcement, that the Court
have the opportunity to have the final say on the substantive constitutional
question.  The final say is likely simply to be the product of the application of a
doctrinal rule that is designed to permit the political branches to adjudge a cer-
tain course of action constitutional in the face of a private party’s challenge in
court.  The Court’s doctrine is not designed (or need not be understood to be
designed), in other words, to serve as a substitute for a political judgment that
such a course of conduct would be unconstitutional.
Of course, even if constitutional doctrine suggests that the Court would re-
solve the substantive constitutional question only through the application of an
institutionally determined rule of deference or prophylaxis, there remain two
distinct questions for the President to consider.  These are identified above as
questions 2 and 3.  Before deciding not to enforce a statute on constitutional
grounds, the President must still make a judgment concerning the appropriate-
ness of substituting his constitutional judgment for that of the Congress (ques-
tion 2).  In addition, the President must consider whether the determination as
to the appropriateness of such substitution is one that the Supreme Court
should be given an opportunity to make (question 3).  The President’s assertion
of interpretive authority to decline to enforce a statute would, after all, preclude
Congress from implementing its own constitutional vision, and perhaps Con-
gress is entitled to be heard in court on just that issue.
III
DEFERENTIAL DOCTRINE IN ACTION:  THREE CASES
Before proceeding further, it is useful to return to the three possible non-
enforcement cases that opened this article: a decision to decline to fire HIV-
positive military personnel in the face of a statute mandating their dismissal; a
his opposition, comes before him judicially, may there find it his duty, al-
though he has in no degree changed his opinion, to declare it constitutional.
 Thayer, supra  note 18, at 144.
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decision to decline to use specified unwarned statements in a criminal prosecu-
tion notwithstanding a statute expressly deeming them to be admissible; and a
decision to decline to enforce a statute requiring the adoption of differential
business regulations that is thought to be the product of nothing more than spe-
cial interest bargaining. The three cases make it possible to consider more con-
cretely the first question a President should ask before deciding whether to de-
cline to enforce a statute.  Even assuming a justiciable controversy brought by a
private party, what is the likelihood that the Court would review the particular
judgment that has led to the President’s conclusion that the statute is unconsti-
tutional?  Considering that question in connection with the three cases shows
why it would be a mistake to think that the best constitutional answer will result
from the Court evaluating the competing substantive constitutional views of the
political branches.
The example that begins Professor Johnsen’s contribution to this sympo-
sium nicely makes the point.  The National Defense Authorization Act for Fis-
cal Year 1996 contained a provision, Section 567, that required the armed forces
to fire all HIV-positive personnel.35  Appearing as it did as a sole provision in a
major authorization bill, the President decided that he could not, as a practical
matter, exercise his veto power solely in order to preclude enactment of Section
567.  Instead, while signing the bill into law, he declared that Section 567 was
“mean-spirited” and unconstitutionally discriminatory under the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.36
The President explained his constitutional conclusion as follows.  He stated
that he had been informed by his lawyers that the discrimination effected by the
statute would be constitutional only if it served “a legitimate governmental pur-
pose.”37  He explained further that he had consulted with the Secretary of De-
fense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and that he had concluded that “the provi-
sion does not serve any valid military or other purpose,” and thus that it was
unconstitutional.38  As a consequence of this substantive judgment, the Presi-
dent announced that he would seek the quick repeal of the provision, that he
would provide as many benefits as the law would allow to those persons who
would have to be fired by operation of Section 567, and that the executive
branch would not defend the statute in a constitutional challenge to the law
brought by a fired armed forces employee.  Significantly, however, the Presi-
dent concluded that he would enforce the measure because to do otherwise
would be to render the case non-justiciable, and thereby to substitute his own
constitutional judgment for that of Congress and the Court.39
35. See Pub. L. No. 104-106, 110 Stat. 86.
36. White House Press Briefing, 1996 WL 54453,  at *1 (Feb. 9, 1996) (statement of Jack Quinn,
Counsel to the President).
37. Id. at *2 (statement of Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel).
38. Id. at *2-3.
39. Id.
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The President appears to have reached his substantive constitutional judg-
ment after having determined that the Court would have applied a rational ba-
sis test in reviewing any court challenge to the constitutionality of the discrimi-
nation mandated by the provision.40  Under that test, as has been suggested, the
Court does not attempt to determine for itself that the statutory compelled dis-
crimination is objectively legitimate given all possible evidence regarding the
merits of the underlying policy.  Instead,
[i]n areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither
proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights
must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classifica-
tion . . . . [A] legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may
be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.41
Significantly, the Court adopts this deferential posture not because of its objec-
tive inability to evaluate competing empirical judgments. Courts make such
evaluations all the time.  The Court instead premises this deferential stance on a
structural assertion about its constitutional place relative to the other two
branches.  As the Court has explained, “[t]he Constitution presumes that, ab-
sent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually
be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial intervention is generally
unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has
acted.”42
Taking this doctrine seriously, the President recognized (or asserted) that
the Court does not purport, in applying rational basis review, to determine
whether a non-suspect legislative classification is legitimate in some compre-
hensive, final sense.43  The Court leaves the ultimate judgment of legitimacy,
and, in this respect, of constitutionality, to the political branches.  As the head
of one of those branches, the President concluded that he had an obligation to
make a judgment as to whether such a statute was legitimate.  In doing so, he
concluded that the statute was unconstitutional without applying the screen of
deference that limits the judicial inquiry, but need not, and, indeed, it would
appear, in the Court’s own view, should not, limit the inquiry of political ac-
tors.44
It must be emphasized that the President’s substantive constitutional judg-
ment in this instance most likely was not the result of a prediction about how
the Court would rule if the case were put before it.  Professor Powell has quite
40. See id. (starting grounds for concluding statute to be unconstitutional that reflect application of
the rational basis test).
41. FCC v. Beach Communications Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-15 (1993).
42. Id. at 314.
43. See id. at 315.
44. There remains the question, of course, of whether the President or Congress ultimately pos-
sesses this power of constitutional judgment.  At this point, however, the important point is that the
Court does not make the ultimate determination of legitimacy, regardless of whether it is the President
or Congress that is assigned the final constitutional authority to determine the provision’s legitimacy.
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plausibly concluded that the Court would have been likely to have upheld Sec-
tion 567 in the face of a private challenge to it.  As he explains,
[j]udged by this standard the argument that a court would have invalidated Section
567 is weak.  While the simple fact of being HIV-positive does not render an individ-
ual incapable of performing his military duties, it would be difficult to claim that it
would be irrational for Congress to conclude that treating HIV-positive individuals for
combat injuries would require safeguards otherwise unnecessary, and that as a conse-
quence their presence in combat units would complicate health care under combat
conditions.  Nondeployability into combat units is an established basis for military
classification, and it seems doubtful that a court would conclude that there was no
“reasonably conceivable state of facts” justifying Section 567’s discrimination.  The
existence of substantial arguments against the value of the discharge requirement
would be irrelevant under the judiciary’s version of the rational-basis test.  The courts
would probably be equally unmoved by the fact that the provision’s congressional
proponent made remarks that could be construed as showing a bias against HIV-
positive persons.45
Assuming Professor Powell’s predictive account is right, it is difficult to see
why the President should understand himself to be required to enforce Section
567.  As Professor Powell indicates, substantial arguments questioning the le-
gitimacy of the legislative choice are likely to be quite irrelevant to the Court
with respect to any judgment that it would consider itself privileged to make in
a constitutional challenge to Section 567.  Taking the doctrine seriously suggests
that the Court would be quite likely to uphold the statute even if seemingly
strong evidence of the absence of any military gain were to be presented.  Since
a “[l]egislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding,” and since the
democratic processes are presumed to be responsible for rectifying many
seemingly unwise political acts, there are structural reasons for having that be
the case when rational basis review applies.46  What, then, is the value of pre-
senting to the Court the view of the Secretary of Defense or the Joint Chiefs?
What is the Court supposed to do with their views, so long as in the absence of
them there would be every reason to conclude that the statute would be up-
held?  Would there not be a structural cost to having the Court independently
evaluate such views?
It might be said in response that the usual rules of deference should not ap-
ply when the political branches are divided over the substantive constitutional
validity of a statute.  Perhaps this assumption underlies the court-centered ap-
proach to non-enforcement.  How, we might ask, could the Court not take into
account the statements of the Secretary of Defense or the Joint Chiefs in evalu-
ating Section 567?  It might be argued, on this view, that the proper course
would be for the Court to attempt to determine the substantiality of the views
of the President’s military advisers and to weigh them against whatever com-
peting policy claims Congress might present.  The Court would then be in the
posture of performing a kind of hard-look review of the military judgments of
the political branches.
45. Powell, supra note 17, at 382-83.
46. Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 307.
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Simply to state that possibility, however, is to reveal how substantial a de-
parture from doctrine would be required for this approach to the non-
enforcement question to prevail.  The Court is disinclined to review legislative
judgments concerning social policy generally with rigor approximating hard-
look review.  It is particularly reluctant to do so when the social judgments at
issue concern the needs of the military.  Thus, even if it were technically possi-
ble for the Court to undertake such review, there would still be the question as
to the President’s authority to urge the Court to depart from its structurally
based, traditionally deferential stance.
The President would be in effect calling upon the Court to give greater scru-
tiny to a legislative judgment than it would ordinarily provide.  What would be
his warrant for doing so?  We are positing that the President is confident, after
all, as Professor Powell has suggested he should have been, that Section 567
would be upheld under rational basis review notwithstanding the substantial
evidence that a private party could have put forth against it.  It is not clear,
therefore, why the President should ask the Court to give less deference to
Congress simply because he now has evidence to put forth against it.  Any such
assertion would have to rest on a claim concerning the relative institutional po-
sitions of the President and the Congress with respect to the authority of each
to determine whether a particular course of governmental conduct is or is not
constitutional.  The essence of the dispute concerns structural interpretive
authority, rather than the relative correctness of the substantive constitutional
judgments that divide the two branches.  It seems odd to require such a dispute
over structure to be resolved through a judicial inquiry into the objective merits
of the substantive conclusions of each branch.  Given the Court’s own doctrine,
the Court would hardly seem to be positioned to render such a decision.  And
given the political branches’ general interest in preserving judicial deference to
their substantive judgments, neither the President nor Congress would seem to
be positioned to call upon the Court to do so.
There is a potential complication here.  The President, in announcing his
judgment that Section 567 was unconstitutional, also concluded that it was
“mean-spirited.”47  This statement may suggest that the President believed the
statute was motivated by “a bare congressional desire to harm” the class being
discriminated against.48  Such biased targeting, even of non-suspect classes,
sometimes triggers more stringent judicial review in the form of what has been
termed “rational basis with teeth.”49  To the extent that the President based his
constitutional judgment on a conclusion of this sort, and to the extent that he
thought that the Court itself would have responded similarly to the statute,
47. White House Press Briefing, supra note 36, at *1.
48. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
49. Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 260 (196)
(citing David O. Stewart, Supreme Court Report: A Growing Equal Protection Clause?, 71 A.B.A.J.
108, 112 (1985)).
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there would be an argument that the submission of competing evidence to the
Court would be perfectly appropriate.
The increased scrutiny that the Court performs in such cases, however, is
not intended to determine conclusively that a statute is or is not “mean-
spirited.”  It simply looks more closely at the connection between legislative
means and ends than it normally would.  Where the connection seems to be
loose, the Court may conclude that the statute is so unlikely to have been moti-
vated by anything other than a bare desire to harm, which would not be a le-
gitimate end of legislation, that the statute must be invalidated.  In cases where
the Court perceives a tighter connection between means and ends, by contrast,
it will not be able to conclude that a private party is entitled to have the Court
hold that the statute was motivated by such a venal purpose.  This latter judg-
ment of constitutionality, however, is itself made through a screen of deference.
It should not be taken to be a conclusive determination that in some objective
sense the statute is not impermissibly motivated and thus that it is objectively
constitutional.
Unlike the Court, the President need not necessarily assess the wrongfulness
of the legislative motive through such a deferential screen.  Accordingly, it
would not appear that the President’s substantive constitutional judgment re-
garding the lawfulness of the legislative motive would actually be reviewed even
if he were to enforce the statute and thereby give rise to a justiciable case.  At
most the President would be informed that the Court, in light of its own institu-
tional limitations, could not exclude possibly non-venal motivations.  Given this,
it would not be clear even on the “bare desire to harm” account why justiciabil-
ity should be the critical factor guiding the President’s non-enforcement deci-
sion.  Justiciability should serve as a constraint, then, only if the President is
convinced that he should be bound in evaluating legislative motive by the same
screen of deference that the Court would apply.
There may be reasons for concluding that the President should be no more
confident of his capacity to evaluate legislative motive than is the Court.  There
is no need to attempt to resolve that question in the abstract here.  It is suffi-
cient to point out that even if the President would not be better positioned to
determine actual motive, whatever that might be, he might well be better posi-
tioned to make a more calibrated assessment of the legislatively asserted con-
nection between means and ends.  In that sense, he may be better positioned to
make a more calibrated assessment of the legislative motive than would a court.
In other words, in some contexts, the President may be better positioned than a
court to conclude that a statute is motivated by what constitutional doctrine
calls “animus,” if only because his knowledge, experience, and institutional van-
tage point all suggest that he need not assess the plausibility of an assertedly
non-venal legislative motive through the same screen of deference as a judge.
That assessment, of course, though formally deemed to be one concerning leg-
islative motive, is hardly different in kind than the judgment about the legiti-
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macy of the claimed need for the legislation that underlay the President’s oppo-
sition to Section 567.
These questions concerning institutional position must be asked.  They
make it possible to judge intelligently whether, in order to preserve the possi-
bility of judicial review of the substantive constitutional question, the President
should be required to enforce a statute that he believes to be unconstitutional.
If there is an interest in having judicial review, it will most likely be because, in
the end, the President does not believe that his interpretive authority to resolve
the constitutional question concerning legislative motive should be privileged
over that of Congress.  If that is the case, though, it would seem that the Presi-
dent should be obliged to defend Congress against private challenge, rather
than to call its motives into question before the Court.  If that is not the case,
then, at most, a requirement of enforcement would make sense only in order to
permit the Court to resolve the second-order, structural question concerning
the relative interpretive authority of the President and Congress.  There would
be no reason to require enforcement solely so that the Court, institutionally
situated as it is, could pass on the substantive question as to whether it believes
that the statute is unconstitutional.
To take another example, consider 18 U.S.C § 3501 (1999).50  The statute
provides that, notwithstanding Miranda’s seeming requirement that certain
statements to the police must be excluded from evidence unless they were made
after the police provided certain warnings, unwarned confessions are admissible
in federal prosecutions.  As it happens, this statute was passed soon after
Miranda had been decided, which may have made it implausible to conclude
that it was anything other than plainly unconstitutional upon enactment.51
Moreover, the statute has now been held unconstitutional by virtue of the
Court’s decision in June in Dickerson v. United States.52  Suppose, however, that
the statute had been passed a few years prior to Dickerson.  Suppose further
that its legislative history contained statements in support of Congress’s judg-
ment that the provision of warnings was now so much a fixture of federal law
enforcement practice, the levels of federal law enforcement training were so
high, and the costs of exclusion of evidence so comparatively great, that there
was no longer any justification in federal prosecutions for an exclusionary rule
to obtain against unwarned statements by the accused.
Prior to Dickerson, it was controversial whether such a statute thus sup-
ported would have been plainly unconstitutional under Miranda.53  For present
purposes, however, assume that the President fairly determined that Congress
had a legitimate claim that the statute complied with Miranda or, at least, that,
50. See Pub. L. 90-351, Title II, § 701(a) (1968).
51. In fact, 18 U.S.C. § 3501 was passed in 1968 as a direct response to Miranda.
52. 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000).
53. The question is controversial not only because of the dispute over whether subsequent prece-
dents have implicitly overruled Miranda, but also because of the possibility that a congressional judg-
ment that circumstances had changed might suffice to undermine the empirical predicate on which
Miranda partially rests.
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consistent with the doctrine of stare decisis, Miranda should be overruled be-
cause of changed circumstances.  Accordingly, the President would not be
bound by Supreme Court doctrine to deem the use of the statements unconsti-
tutional; at the very least, he could make a reasonable argument for the decision
to be overruled or distinguished in light of new factual circumstances.  Moreo-
ver, suppose the President was convinced that in light of the current composi-
tion of the Court, the direction of recent precedent, and the surprisingly defer-
ential tone toward the federal government that pervades the opinion in
Miranda, the Court would be likely to uphold such a federal statute.  Would the
President nonetheless have the authority to declare the use of the statements
unconstitutional and decline to offer any unwarned statements into evidence on
constitutional grounds?
As a technical matter, one might conclude that the statute implicitly reserves
this discretionary judgment to the President, as he is presumed for constitu-
tional reasons to retain general prosecutorial discretion unless a statute clearly
withdraws it.  If that is true, then perhaps the President can “frustrate” the stat-
ute simply through an exercise of the very residual discretion that the statute
implicitly permits the President to exercise.  But if the statute could not be so
construed, may he nevertheless contravene the statute on the basis of his sub-
stantive constitutional judgment?54
The court-centered approach to the non-enforcement question would sug-
gest that he may not.  Perhaps not surprisingly, the Administration’s position
with respect to Section 3501 appears to have been that the provision was uncon-
stitutional but that the Administration would use the unwarned statements if, in
a case determining the continuing validity of Miranda, the Court concluded that
it could.55  The Administration’s stance was consistent with the court-centered
approach to questions of non-enforcement.  Insofar as the President’s actions
are predicated on a controversial constitutional conviction, and one with which
the Court might disagree, the President should use the unwarned statements so
as to ensure that the Court may resolve that constitutional dispute.  The Court’s
resolution, whether upholding or invalidating the statute, would then be bind-
ing.  A contrary approach by the President, the court-centered approach sug-
gests, inappropriately disregards the Supreme Court’s special place in the con-
stitutional structure as the final arbiter of constitutional meaning.
54. Even if the statute may be read to prohibit the President from declining to use the evidence
unless his determination not to do so rests on a constitutional judgment, it is not at all clear that the
court-centered approach would favor such an interpretation of the statutory language.  Such an inter-
pretation would privilege the constitutional judgment of the President over that of the Court by permit-
ting the President to moot a justiciable constitutional question through the exercise of a discretionary
power to withhold evidence the admission of which he believes to be unconstitutional.  It would seem
that, under the court-centered approach’s conception of the Supreme Court’s special role in the consti-
tutional structure, such a construction of an ambiguous statutory text should be disfavored.
55. See Brief for The United States, Dickerson v. United States, No. 99-5525, 2000 WL 141075, at
*6 n. 4 (Jan. 28, 2000).
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There is another approach, however, that becomes available if one focuses
on the kind of review that the Court could employ in a justiciable case chal-
lenging the statutory authorization of the use of the kind of unwarned state-
ments that were at issue in Miranda.  A President might notice immediately
upon reviewing Miranda that the warnings it prescribed as necessary (though
not necessarily exclusively necessary) were taken from the warnings that the
Federal Bureau of Investigation had instructed its officers to provide.56  The
President might notice as well that in the only case before the Court in Miranda
involving questioning by federal law enforcement officers, the Court did not
appear to require proof that the warnings had been given by the federal offi-
cers.57  The Court rested its judgment excluding statements in that case in large
part on the fact that the suspect had been questioned at length by local officials
prior to being questioned by federal authorities; it was the taint that flowed
from the local questioning on which the Court rested its judgment.58  In addi-
tion, the President might notice that the Court’s own empirical judgment as to
the likely costs of imposing a warning requirement was heavily influenced by its
observation that the Federal Bureau of Investigation did not believe that the
costs of such warnings were too high.59  Finally, the President might notice that
the federal government itself had requested in Miranda that the Court withhold
crafting a broad rule applicable in all jurisdictions until regulations could be
formulated at the state and local level that would presumably mirror the more
protective practices of federal law enforcement.60
None of this evidence from the opinion would necessarily suffice to suggest
to a conscientious President that Miranda was not intended to apply to the fed-
eral government.  It could be read to suggest, however, that the Court was sen-
sitive, even in applying the exclusionary rule to the federal government, to the
superior expertise in matters of law enforcement of federal law enforcement
authorities.  Respect for that superior knowledge led the Court to adopt its rule
in Miranda in a fashion that consciously drew upon the federal law enforcement
community’s own past practices and judgments about the costs of those prac-
tices—practices that were notably more restrictive of police power than those of
the states.  It would not be at all strange to conclude, therefore, that a current
judgment by federal law enforcement as to the necessity and workability of an
exclusionary rule would itself be entitled to substantial constitutional weight.  In
other words, the Executive could conclude that federal law enforcement prac-
tices and views at the time of Miranda helped set the possible bounds of the
constitutional limitation on governmental conduct that the Court fashioned in
Miranda.  Similarly, the executive could conclude that current federal law en-
forcement practices and views regarding the costs and benefits of an exclusion-
56. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 483-88 (1966).
57. See id. at 494-98.  Miranda represented a judgment in several consolidated cases.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 494-98.
60. See id. at 490.
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ary rule might suggest the need for retaining it now, notwithstanding a contrary
judgment by Congress or the Court in deference to the statute.
Interestingly, the Administration’s brief in Dickerson, asking the Supreme
Court to reaffirm Miranda and to reverse the lower court decision permitting
unwarned statements to be admitted pursuant to Section 3501, set forth an ar-
gument that is not altogether distinct from the one sketched out above.  The
Administration’s brief argued that while there are costs to an exclusionary rule,
there are also important benefits.61  In particular, the Administration’s brief ar-
gued that the Miranda rule has the virtue of providing clear guidance to law en-
forcement officers, thereby disciplining their police practices and increasing the
likelihood that law enforcement officers will provide warnings to suspects in
custody, a practice that the brief noted has long been favored by the federal
government.62  The brief noted further that Miranda has been beneficial because
it “facilitates the admission in evidence of confessions that follow the admini-
stration of the warnings; it bolsters the credibility of such confessions in the eyes
of jurors; and it generally contributes to the perceived fairness of the criminal
justice system.”63  Indeed, the brief contended that  “Miranda has come to play a
unique and important role in the nation’s conception of our criminal justice sys-
tem:  it promotes public confidence that the criminal justice system is fair.
Overruling Miranda . . . would thus tend to undermine public confidence in the
fairness of the system.”64
The Administration brief suggested, however, that the question whether
Miranda announced a constitutional rule could be determined merely from a
consideration of precedents.  It suggested that the more empirical determina-
tions concerning the costs or benefits of such a constitutional rule are relevant
only to the question of whether stare decisis principles justify affirmance of the
prior precedent or its overruling.65  To be sure, there was a formal legal question
to be resolved in Dickerson concerning whether the Court in its subsequent
precedents had effectively held that Miranda did not announce a constitutional
rule.  There remained, however, a question concerning the substantive premises
of Miranda itself.  Even if one were to conclude that those subsequent prece-
dents had not deprived Miranda of constitutional force, there remained the
question as to the constitutional basis for the Miranda decision itself.  As to this
question, the Administration’s brief seemed to take a purely formal view, as if
the Miranda holding rested on nothing other than a construction of text, history
and prior precedent.  That formal view of Miranda may emanate from the same
conception of constitutionalism that underlies the court-centered approach to
non-enforcement.  Such an approach tends to conceive of constitutional mean-
61. See Brief for the United States, supra note 55, at *9.
62. Id. at *33-38.
63. Id. at *50.
64. Id. at *49.
65. Compare id. at *11-29 (discussing whether Miranda announces a constitutional rule) and id. at
*29-50 (discussing stare decisis).
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ing as something that can be divined by the Court alone using purely formal
tools, as if its doctrine is necessarily constructed on the basis of the kind of
judgments that by their nature are the province of judges rather than political
actors.66
If a President were to depart from this conception of constitutionalism, he
might conclude that Miranda’s substantive constitutional conclusion was predi-
cated in large part on less formal considerations.  He might be convinced that its
ruling emanated in part from the institutional practices and judgments of fed-
eral law enforcement authorities.  He might conclude that such an emanation in
turn resulted in the imposition of a limitation on the federal government, the
bounds of which were partially defined by the practices of the federal law en-
forcement officials themselves.  The President might be inclined to conclude,
therefore, that a court judgment upholding the hypothetical version of 18
U.S.C. § 3501 would not reflect a determination that the Constitution, as an
objective matter, fails to require an exclusionary rule for unwarned statements.
He might be convinced that such a judgment would be the product, in signifi-
cant part, of a deferential assessment of the more functional judgments of the
federal government regarding the costs and benefits of an exclusionary rule.  As
a result, the President might conclude that, even if the Court would not strike
down a statute that would permit (or require) the admission of unwarned
statements into evidence, the Constitution nonetheless bars the executive
branch from admitting such evidence, the statute notwithstanding.  This presi-
dential judgment as to constitutional meaning would rest on an assessment of
the factual predicate for a constitutional rule barring the admission of unwarned
statements.  That predicate would be the same one that Congress had assessed,
albeit in a controversial manner, in enacting the hypothesized Section 3501.
Whatever his disagreement with Congress’s assessment, the President might be
confident that each of the political branches was better positioned to undertake
such functional assessment than the courts.
The Court might, of course, reject the statutorily enunciated judgment that
an exclusionary rule is unnecessary, unworkable, or too costly.  To the extent
that the Court were to credit that statutory judgment on grounds of deference,
the resultant constitutional judgment that the Court would announce could not
be divorced from the institutional structure that produces it.  The Court would
at most be adjudicating the relative authority to resolve substantive constitu-
tional meaning in a dispute between an accused defendant and the political
branches of the United States (albeit in a circumstance in which the political
branches were themselves divided).
Consequently, the President might conclude that in a case challenging the
statute, the Court’s actual judgment would be made through a screen of defer-
ence.  To that extent, therefore, the President may fairly wonder why it is criti-
cal that his judgment as to the constitutional necessity of an exclusionary rule be
66. It must be admitted that the Court’s ultimate decision in Dickerson adopted a similarly formal
approach.
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reviewed by the Court.  It may be that there would be utility in having the
Court essentially validate his own substantive constitutional judgment over the
contrary judgment of Congress.  But what if the President were convinced that
the Court would not do so because of the limitations that the demands of defer-
ence appropriately place on its decisional authority?  What basis would there be
for a conclusion that the Court would be in a position to evaluate the type of
dispute over the need for an exclusionary rule that divides the President and
Congress?  Why should the President not conclude that, taking the relevant
doctrine seriously, he is in a better position than the Court, though perhaps not
Congress, to evaluate the likely consequences that would flow from permitting
unwarned statements to be used in evidence?  Surely as the chief federal law
enforcement officer, the President would seem to be positioned to undertake
such an inquiry.
Moreover, the President may conclude that it is most unwise to invite the
Court to depart from the essentially deferential stance to federal law enforce-
ment that the Court adopted in Miranda.  He may not wish to suggest that a
private party challenging 18 U.S.C. § 3501 should be permitted to undermine a
statutory conclusion through courtroom factfinding even when, as here, such an
undermining of statutory judgments would redound to vindicate his own consti-
tutional judgment.  Nor may he wish to suggest that the exclusionary rule for
unwarned statements involves only a question of formal meaning, divorced
from more empirical judgments of costs and benefits.  After all, such a sugges-
tion seems to make binding a judicial decision to affirm the statute despite the
President’s constitutional conviction to the contrary.  The President’s dispute
with the constitutional judgment of Congress, in other words, may be one that is
solely with Congress.  It is a dispute that occurs in the shadow of the Court’s
doctrine, and the President may be that convinced that it should remain there.
Finally, the President may realize that by inviting the Court to weigh his as-
sessment of consequences against Congress’s, the President would necessarily
be arguing that he is entitled to subject the statute to a more severe form of ju-
dicial review than would ordinarily obtain.  The President’s warrant for doing
so, however, would have to rest on a claim about the relative authority of each
of the political branches to implement the Constitution.  If that is the essence of
the dispute, it seems odd to call upon the Court to mediate it through a substan-
tive evaluation of each branch’s assessment.  After all, the President is con-
vinced that each branch’s evaluation, predicated as each would be on a practical
determination, is superior in a structural sense to the one that the Court could
offer.  Why then have the Court substitute its substantive judgment for their
competing substantive judgments?  At most the Court would appear to have a
role to play in resolving the structural dispute over the relative interpretive
authority of the competing political branches.  Its authority to resolve that
structural dispute, however, does not imply an authority to resolve the under-
lying dispute over the substantive constitutional question that divides the politi-
cal branches.
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It should now be apparent that this same type of analysis could apply as well
to the third case set forth at the outset of this article.  That case concerns a
President’s decision to decline to enforce a statute requiring the Administration
to apply differential business regulations to seemingly similar professions out of
a concern that the differential regulatory burden is the product of an illegiti-
mate, and thus unconstitutional, legislative distinction.  To be sure, if the Presi-
dent decided to carry out the statute’s purpose, the Court would be likely to
uphold the resulting regulations against a constitutional challenge that they
violate a constitutional norm of equality.  At the very least, the President would
surely be acting reasonably in defending such regulations (and the underlying
statute requiring their promulgation) against such private challenge.  The ra-
tional basis test would clearly be applicable to legislation of this type.  The stat-
ute establishes a classification in a commercial context that does not affect a
suspect class or tread upon a fundamental right.  It would be unlikely, therefore,
that the Court would strike down the statute merely because it was the product
of special interest bargaining.
It is unlikely but not inconceivable.  There are precedents enough to suggest
that the test of legitimacy under the rational basis standard of review can be
flunked on grounds other than animus.  A court would be loath to judge a dis-
tinction arbitrary even if it seemed to be explicable only as a consequence of
special-interest deal-making.  The doctrine nevertheless suggests that such pure
deal-making or favoritism of a private interest for no public purpose is illegiti-
mate.67  That doctrinal suggestion would therefore provide a space that would
allow the President to understand himself to be vindicating a constitutional limi-
tation in declining to promulgate the differential business regulations notwith-
standing the statute’s mandate.  That space would exist even though the doc-
trine would not lead the Court, positioned as it is, to the same judgment, if it
were called upon to review the statute or the resulting regulations.
Moreover, as in the other two examples, the doctrinal space that would
permit the President to reach such a conclusion would also suggest that there
would be little reason to ensure that such a conviction would be reviewed by the
Court.  The very deference on which the doctrine rests makes it difficult to see
what would be gained by returning to the Court for a review of the constitu-
tional judgment that the President had reached.  What divides the President and
Congress is a conclusion as to the degree to which some public, non-deal-
making purpose justifies the legislation.  The doctrine is designed, however, to
ensure that the Court does not have to adjudicate such questions in cases chal-
lenging the rationality of statutes that are brought by private parties.  Why,
then, have the Court intervene to resolve the substantive dispute between the
branches?
The discussion thus far does not resolve the question in favor of the Presi-
dent exercising the non-enforcement power in any of the cases addressed
67. See Cass R. Sunstein, Public Values, Private Interests, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1982
SUP. CT. REV. 127, 165 (discussing this point in connection with rational basis review).
BARRON_FMT2.DOC 11/14/00  10:34 AM
88 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 63: Nos. 1 & 2
above, let alone whenever the President believes a statute to be unconstitu-
tional.  It demonstrates only that a determination that a statute is unconstitu-
tional often will be the product of a form of reasoning that doctrine suggests (or
should be understood to suggest) the Court will not itself perform in a justici-
able case.  This basic limitation on the Court’s decisional processes cannot be
overcome, therefore, simply by supplying the Court with more information.  It
can be overcome at most only with arguments as to why the Court’s decisional
processes should not be so limited in cases where the President and Congress
are divided on a substantive constitutional question.
Those arguments, it has been suggested, necessarily turn on contentions
about the relative authority of the two branches to decide constitutional ques-
tions and the authority of the President to make the Congress meet a higher
standard of proof than it would ordinarily be called upon to bear in a constitu-
tional case before the Court.68  It has been suggested as well that there are struc-
tural costs to such arguments succeeding.  Such arguments assume that constitu-
tional meaning is ultimately something that the Court alone is capable of
discerning.  If successful, such arguments would expand the scope of the Court’s
decisional power in a manner that ultimately neither the President nor Congress
may favor.  At the same time, such arguments impliedly assume that the Court
possesses a preclusive power to resolve constitutional meaning.  As a result,
these arguments implicitly confine the possible scope of substantive constitu-
tional limitations to those that a particular institution, the Court, is prepared to
acknowledge.
There may still be reasons to confine the President’s exercise of the non-
enforcement power with a justiciability constraint.  There are reasons to be
wary of predicating such a constraint on the need to ensure that the Court will
have an opportunity to pass on the substantive constitutional dispute that di-
vides the political branches.  Nonetheless, there might be reasons to conclude
that such a constraint is necessary to ensure that a court has an opportunity to
adjudicate the structural dispute that divides the President and Congress:
namely, the dispute over the relative authority of each to resolve substantive
constitutional questions.  To examine the merits of that contention, it is impor-
tant first to determine what entitles the President to contend that the Executive
branch’s constitutional views should prevail over those of Congress.
IV
THE RELATIVE INTERPRETIVE AUTHORITY OF THE POLITICAL BRANCHES
It could be argued that the President’s role in the lawmaking process is
clearly confined in the Constitution to either signing a bill into law or exercising
the veto power.  The President may make his constitutional views determinative
of whether a law shall have effect at the moment at which the President decides
either to sign or to veto legislation.  In circumstances where the President has
68. See supra at pages 91-95.
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chosen not to exercise that veto power, as was the case with respect to Section
567, or where the veto has been overridden, all that remains for him to do is to
enforce the duly enacted law.69
The Clinton Administration’s non-enforcement opinion is persuasive in con-
tending that the availability of the veto power should not be fatal to a claim of
non-enforcement.  It is far from clear that a proper respect for congressional
power warrants a conclusion that would preclude a subsequent President from
giving effect to his own constitutional vision merely because a predecessor de-
clined to employ the veto power.  It would be odd as well to conclude that the
President has no choice but to enforce a statute that is plainly unconstitutional
in the eyes of the Court.  There is also the practical reality that, in an era of om-
nibus legislation, a requirement that the veto power alone be employed would
significantly restrict the President’s authority to realize his constitutional vision
in any case in which a constitutionally troubling measure was attached to
pressing, but otherwise constitutionally uncontroversial, legislation.  Moreover,
the constitutional text certainly cannot be said of its own force to require such a
construction, and, as the Clinton Administration opinion demonstrates, long-
standing executive practice is inconsistent with any such categorical interpreta-
tion.70  Taken together, these reasons suggest, as Professor Johnsen well ex-
plains,71 that some non-enforcement power inheres in either the Take Care
Clause or in more implicit structural presuppositions.  The critical question con-
cerns less whether any such power exists at all, than what the scope of that
power should be.72
In resolving the question of scope, the President could believe that, as the
head of a coordinate branch of government, he is no less entitled than Congress
to come to a conviction about the Constitution’s meaning.  One could accept
that both the President and Congress are bound to respect Supreme Court
judgments that certain courses of governmental conduct are unconstitutional.
One could nonetheless believe that the chief executive should be just as free as
Congress to adjudge conduct unlawful even though the courts would uphold it.
Congress, in the performance of its constitutional functions, may act on the ba-
sis of its own constitutional vision, thereby declining to adopt certain legislation
that the President may have favored.  Perhaps, then, the President may in the
performance of his constitutional functions act on the basis of his own constitu-
tional vision, thereby declining to enforce legislation that Congress favors.
The argument would draw strength from the text of the Take Care Clause.
The Clause confers, or imposes, upon the President the unique constitutional
responsibility to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.  The Constitution
69. See Johnsen, supra note 2, at 14-16 (setting forth and criticizing this view).
70. See Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. Off. Legal
Counsel 1999 (Nov. 2, 1994).
71. See Johnsen, supra note 2, at 34-36.
72. See David S. Strauss, Presidential Interpretation of the Constitution, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 113,
117 (1993).
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itself, on this account, is one of the laws that must be faithfully executed.  Thus,
the President may argue that it is quite clear that he has not only the authority,
but the duty to enforce the Constitution, as supreme law, even if that means, as
a consequence, declining to enforce a statute that is in conflict with the Consti-
tution.73
There is a significant problem with resolving this question of scope in such
an absolutist fashion.  It is a problem that mirrors the mistaken conception of
constitutional meaning outlined above.  The Court in enforcing the Constitution
does not purport to do so in a vacuum.  It attempts only to implement the Con-
stitution in light of its position within a constitutional structure that divides
authority between distinct types of governmental institutions.  The Court has
adopted limitations on the scope if its own interpretive authority out of respect
for coordinate branches of government.  These limitations suggest that the
President should be wary of a view of the Take Care Clause that would discount
the competing interpretive capacities of other institutional actors, the Congress
included.
A broad assertion of final presidential authority over all constitutional ques-
tions, regardless of the competing constitutional vision that Congress may have
asserted, seems to be inconsistent with the very notion of a structure of coordi-
nate branches and separated powers.  At the very least, it certainly seems that
such an expansive view of presidential non-enforcement power should not be an
available line of argument if one wants to challenge the court-centered ap-
proach on its own terms.  Such an expansive conception of presidential author-
ity, after all, would rest on a conception of the constitutional structure that
would be blind to the ways in which constitutional doctrine itself suggests that
the scope of an institution’s interpretive authority is defined by a structure in
which there are three branches sharing power rather than one branch exercising
all of it.
As we have seen, the Supreme Court, in giving life to the Constitution, is
bound by rules of deference to competing interpreters in many contexts.  Those
rules seem reflective of the Court’s role in the constitutional structure rather
than antithetical to it.  So, too, the President should understand himself to be
bound by rules of deference to competing interpreters, the Congress included.
That is particularly true in contexts where the constitutional structure suggests
that the interpretive judgment to be made is one over which Congress, rather
than the President, should have primary decisional authority.  The President
may, it is true, be in some sense implicated in the constitutional harm that fol-
lows the carrying out of an unconstitutional law by virtue of his enforcement of
that law.  That circumstance, however, should not free him of the demands of
deference any more than the Court’s implication in that harm by virtue of its
entry of a judgment should free it of similar demands.  The President’s oath to
73. See generally Michael S. Paulsen¸ The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What
the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994) (arguing that the President has co-equal interpretive authority with
the courts).
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protect, preserve, and defend the Constitution, no less than his obligation to
take care that the laws be faithfully executed, comport with a mode of enforce-
ment that is predicated on deference to competing interpreters in certain cir-
cumstances.  For it is just such deference that the President is committing to
provide in taking his oath and assuming his obligation to faithfully execute the
laws.  The demands of deference that free the President to adjudge laws uncon-
stitutional that the Court would uphold also may serve to constrain the Presi-
dent to enforce laws he believes to be to be unconstitutional but that the Con-
gress has enacted.
Moreover, it is possible to consider the Take Care Clause in less absolutist
terms that permit the demands of inter-branch deference to constrain the Presi-
dent’s independent interpretive authority.  Supreme Court doctrine indicates
that the political branches are often better positioned, as a matter of constitu-
tional structure, to make the evaluation of substantive unconstitutionality than
the Court itself would be.  The same might be true in disputes between the
President and Congress.   It is only in circumstances in which such a judgment
would be persuasive on this account that the non-enforcement power would lie.
Thomas Jefferson’s famous statement of the President’s interpretive
authority to deem actions by the competing branches unlawful provides some
support for a structural approach to the exercise of the non-enforcement power
that would sanction its exercise in some but not all cases. Writing to Abigail
Adams, Jefferson explained:
You seem to think it devolved on the judges to decide on the validity of the sedition
law.  But nothing in the Constitution has given them a right to decide for the Execu-
tive, more than to the Executive to decide for them.  Both magistracies are equally in-
dependent in the sphere of action assigned to them.  The judges, believing the law
constitutional, had a right to pass a sentence of fine and imprisonment; because that
power was placed in their hands by the Constitution.  But the Executive, believing the
law to be unconstitutional, was bound to remit the execution of it; because that power
has been confided to him by the Constitution.  That instrument meant that its co-
ordinate branches would be checks on each other.  But the opinion which gives to the
judges the right to decide what laws are constitutional, and what not, not only for
themselves in their own sphere of action, but for the Legislature & Executive also, in
their spheres, would make the judiciary a despotic branch.74
Jefferson need not be understood to be arguing broadly that the relevant sphere
of action to be compared among the branches is constitutional interpretation as
such.  Rather, he may be understood to be arguing only that the President has
the constitutional authority to exercise the pardon power to remit sentences,
and that in the exercise of that constitutionally vested power, he is free to make
a judgment as to a law’s unconstitutionality.  The judiciary’s contrary judgment
as expressed in performing the quite distinct task of rendering a sentence
should not be understood to be preclusive of that authority.
Jefferson’s approach is useful not because it proves how the Framers would
have approached the question.  It almost certainly does not.  It is useful because
74. PETER M. SHANE & HAROLD BRUFF, THE LAW OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 396 (1988) (quot-
ing VIII WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 310 (P. Ford ed. 1897)).
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it offers a persuasive approach in its own right.  It takes cognizance of the man-
ner in which the constitutional structure divides power in order to promote a
sharing of constitutional interpretive authority through the exercise of the pow-
ers that the Constitution grants to the various branches.  It is useful as well be-
cause Jefferson’s approach resonates with the approach that the Court has
taken in its own doctrine with respect to the scope of its interpretive authority
under the Constitution.  The Court has not attempted to assert itself as a final
authority on constitutional meaning in all cases that come before it.  It has
rather attempted, even in the course of asserting its authority to place limita-
tions on other branches of government, to leave room for other branches to
make constitutional judgments on their own.  In doing so, it has situated itself
within the constitutional structure, taking account, as best as it can, of its own
institutional advantages and limitations.  A similar structural sharing of inter-
pretive authority might therefore be understood to be expected to occur be-
tween the political branches.
This approach to the scope of the non-enforcement power suggests that it is
critical for the President to assess his place in the constitutional structure in de-
termining the scope of his non-enforcement power.  It would not be enough, on
this view, for the President to assert that he has adjudged a statute unconstitu-
tional and therefore that he must not give it effect.  He must also assess whether
the matter at hand is one over which he has interpretive authority relative to
the competing branches.  As has been suggested, he will often conclude that the
constitutional structure suggests that he does possess interpretive authority rela-
tive to the Court by virtue of the screen of deference through which the Court
creates constitutional doctrine.  It will also sometimes suggest, though many
times it will not, that he possesses a similar authority with respect to Congress.
The pardon power is obviously an unusual grant of interpretive authority to
the President, but it is not necessarily an exclusive one.  Here, the general
framework for analysis of the scope of power of the competing political
branches may prove to be helpful.  The basic separation of powers framework
for analyzing the scope of presidential authority is set forth in Justice Jackson’s
famous concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer,75 which addressed
the constitutionality of President Truman’s seizure of steel mills.  The Jackson
concurrence explains that the President’s independent authority to act must rest
on an exclusive power in order to be exercised in express derogation of a con-
gressional prohibition.  In areas in which there is “a zone of twilight in which he
and the Congress may have concurrent authority,” the President may act with-
out express statutory authority so long as Congress has not forbidden it.76  Oth-
erwise, the President may act only when authorized by statute to do so.
Here, we are concerned not with the President acting in the conventional
sense of asserting power over individuals or entities, but rather with the Presi-
dent refusing to act in order to protect the statutory targets of enforcement
75. 343 U.S. 579, 634-35 (1952).
76. Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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from the imposition of governmental power.  As a consequence, we might con-
clude that even though every assertion of the non-enforcement power is neces-
sarily in derogation of a congressional command, the President need not be un-
derstood to be limited to asserting the non-enforcement power only pursuant to
the exclusive powers—such as the Pardon Power—that the Constitution affords
him.  We might conclude that the non-enforcement power should exist with re-
spect to those matters within “the zone of twilight” that Justice Jackson identi-
fies.77
With the frame thus shifted, it might seem that every case of non-
enforcement should be deemed within the zone of twilight.  The constitutional
text is unclear as to the scope of the non-enforcement power, and the power it-
self strikes at the heart of the President’s role as a coordinate constitutional ac-
tor in that he alone is ultimately responsible for actually carrying out the policy
that has been enacted into law.78  If that were the case, then the zone of twilight
metaphor that Justice Jackson employed would have little constraining effect on
the scope of the President’s interpretive authority.  It would simply serve meta-
phorically to describe the existence of a broad and unilateral presidential power
that would be available in all cases.  It would make the power seem more exclu-
sive than concurrent.  It seems a mistake, however, to conceive of the zone of
77. This analysis parallels that set forth in Professor Strauss’s article in this symposium.  See Peter
Strauss, The President and Choices Not to Enforce, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107 (Winter/Spring
2000).  It is useful to distinguish in this regard between two types of statutes.  Some statutes act directly
to affect the rights and obligations of private persons at the moment of their passage, either by declar-
ing certain private activity to be unlawful, as the criminal drug laws do, or by imposing financial liabili-
ties upon non-governmental actors, as provisions of the tax code do.  The non-enforcement power may
be exercised in only a partial sense with respect to such provisions.  The President may refuse to insti-
tute prosecutions or collection actions, but such refusals cannot suffice to prevent these statutes from
having an operable chilling effect upon the conduct of its targets.  The chilling effect persists because it
is not obvious that even an executive’s express commitment not to enforce will suffice to terminate the
risk of future prosecution or collection that may arise from the legislative judgment of criminality or
liability.  Other statutes, by contrast, affect the rights and obligations of private persons only indirectly
through the commands or limitations they impose upon the executive.  The non-enforcement power
may be exercised in the full sense with respect to such statutes.  Indeed, the three hypothetical non-
enforcement cases that have been discussed so far involve statutes of this latter type.  These statutes
purport to affect non-governmental targets indirectly through their commands to the executive: Fire
HIV-positive military personnel; admit statements in criminal prosecutions even though they were pro-
vided without prior warnings; and promulgate certain regulations but not others.  The President may
preclude these statutes from having any operable effect simply by refusing to act.  Indeed, it is for that
reason that the non-enforcement decision in these cases threatens to render a constitutional dispute
non-justiciable.  Of course, this distinction will not always hold.  One can imagine, for example, a statu-
tory direction to the Federal Communications Commission to decline to renew broadcast licenses for
broadcasters that fail to air sufficient local programming.  An executive branch assertion that such a
provision is unconstitutional may not suffice to allay broadcaster concerns that current programming
choices will figure in future renewal decisions.
78. For present purposes, and notwithstanding the previous note’s reference to the Federal Com-
munications Commission, the analysis focuses solely on statutes that contemplate direct presidential
enforcement, or enforcement by actors plainly subordinate to the President.  Whether the non-
enforcement power should be understood to operate with the same force as against a statute that di-
rects an independent agency raises potentially distinct questions.
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twilight in this fashion.  Justice Jackson identified it as the area within which the
President possessed concurrent, rather than exclusive power.
A consequence of Justice Jackson’s typology, moreover, was that Congress
possessed the authority to preclude the President from acting if it made its in-
tention clear enough with respect to those matters within the zone of twilight.
If there is a non-enforcement power in the executive, however, it is not one
whose contours should be a function of congressional command.  Congress
could not pass a general statute precluding the exercise of that power across the
board and thereby deprive the President of that power.  Nor would it seem sen-
sible to presume that it is unclear whether Congress would in fact intend to
command the President to enforce a statute despite his constitutional misgiv-
ings.79  It seems quite sensible to conclude that Congress intends for the statutes
it enacts to be enforced notwithstanding a President’s constitutional qualms.
If the zone of twilight metaphor is to be helpful, its utility is to be found in
its identification of areas in which there is a structural presumption of inde-
pendent executive authority.  In these twilight areas, where the President is free
to act in the absence of express or implicit congressional authorization, it is pre-
sumed that the constitutional structure affords the President a measure of insti-
tutional authority that entitles his judgment to significant weight.  These areas
would seem to constitute a good proxy for the types of areas in which the Presi-
dent’s constitutional judgment should be entitled to weight in a structural sense.
In these areas, the President is not the mere minister of congressional will; he is
structurally presumed to be an independently responsible constitutional actor.
As such, it would seem a sound construction of constitutional structure to per-
mit him to assert his substantive constitutional views only with respect to such
matters.
There has been little elucidation, in the years following Justice Jackson’s
concurrence, as to the contours of the zone of twilight.  The classic areas in
which there is thought to be concurrent executive and legislative authority con-
cern foreign affairs and national security matters.80  Issues concerning the mili-
tary also are generally thought to fall into this category.  Indeed, it is no doubt
because of the presumption of concurrent, though not exclusive, presidential
authority in these areas that the usual rules governing the specificity of congres-
sional delegation of authority to the President are expressly relaxed as to mat-
ters pertaining to the exercise of military, foreign affairs, and national security
79. At the same time, as will be discussed later, Congress is not powerless to protect its interests
against non-enforcement.  There are, as an initial matter, the usual means, albeit political rather than
legal, of legislative oversight of executive branch action.  In addition, Congress would still retain the
power to confer a cause of action on statutory beneficiaries to bring to a court the claim that, in the
context at issue, the President lacks the kind of structural authority to substitute his constitutional
judgment for that of Congress that would entitle him to decline to enforce a duly enacted law.
80. See Russell Dean Covey, Note, Adventures in the Zone of Twilight: Separation of Powers and
National Economic Security in the Mexican Bailout, 105 YALE L. J. 1311, 1314-24 (1996) (reviewing the
doctrine).
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matters.81  The Court evinces little concern with sweeping standardless delega-
tions in these areas precisely because of the structural presumption in favor of
executive, rather than legislative, decisionmaking over such matters.
That a similar structural presumption in favor of sweeping standardless
delegations applies to the executive’s exercise of the criminal prosecutorial
function suggests that this function also exists within the zone of twilight.  To be
sure, the President has no authority to prosecute anyone for a criminal offense
in the absence of a sufficiently specific statute criminalizing the conduct that
gives rise to the prosecution.  The manner in which the executive exercises its
discretion to prosecute those offenses that have been specified as criminal by
statute, however, is a matter over which the President is presumed to possess
implicit, sweeping, and relatively unguided discretion.82  That presumption of
authority explains not only why Congress need not specify enforcement stan-
dards in legislation to guide the executive in the carrying out of his prosecuto-
rial functions, but also why the executive branch need not make public in ad-
vance the standards that it will employ to carry out that function.  Indeed, the
Court’s recent decisions rejecting constitutionally-based claims of selective
prosecution reflect the structural presumption of independent executive
authority to define enforcement criteria and methodologies, even though such
decisions do not go so far as to demonstrate that such discretion is exclusively
vested in the executive branch.83  The same presumption of structural authority
that justifies the exercise of such unconstrained, delegated discretion suggests
that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is also within the zone of twilight.84
With this background in place, it is useful to return to the three non-
enforcement cases set forth above, starting first with the example of Section
567.  It is quite likely that the President’s confidence in declaring the provision
unconstitutional owed to his understanding of the authority that he has been
granted under the Constitution as commander-in-chief.85  Congress has constitu-
tionally vested authority to prescribe regulations for the armed forces, and thus
the President could not claim an exclusive interpretive authority, as he might
with respect to the pardon power.  In light of the President’s commander-in-
chief powers, it nevertheless seems quite reasonable to conclude that as a mat-
ter of structure the President possessed an authority not unlike that Jefferson
believed he possessed under the Pardon Clause.  At least, given Congress’s own
textual grant of authority to regulate the military,86 it seems reasonable to con-
81. See, e.g., United States v. Loving, 517 U.S. 748, 750 (1995) (discussing delegations concerning
military matters).
82. See SHANE & BRUFF, supra note 74, at 396, 438-39 (discussing prosecutorial discretion).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996); United Sates v Whren, 517 U.S.
806, 813 (1996).
84. This list, it should be apparent, is not intended to be exhaustive or exclusive.  It is rather sug-
gestive of the types of areas within which the President’s structural claim to relative interpretive
authority is likely to be greatest.
85. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 15.
86. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
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clude that the question concerned one over which the political branches share
power and thus that the President was not in a position where, as a matter of
constitutional structure, he should simply defer to the legislative judgment.  In
this respect, we might say that the interpretive question arises in the zone of
twilight Justice Jackson identified.
A more difficult case is presented by the hypothetical version of 18 U.S.C. §
3501.  There, the President has no express textual grant of authority analogous
to the commander-in-chief power.  Nevertheless, the President does possess the
executive power itself, which, along with the Take Care Clause, has been the
basis for the traditional presumption of broad prosecutorial discretion to refrain
from bringing charges, even in the face of intense political pressure to do so.87  It
may be that Congress possesses the constitutional authority to divest the Presi-
dent of that authority, but so long as it continues to grant federal prosecutors
broad authority to make lenient charging decisions and to refrain from engaging
in harsh practices, the President may well conclude that it cannot now oust him
utterly from making a judgment as to constitutionality of excluding unwarned
statements alone.88  The overall statutory framework of the criminal code eve-
rywhere reflects an abiding trust in the executive branch’s structural authority
to make judgments concerning the manner in which prosecutions are carried
out.  The decision that certain evidence should not be used in making a case
would seem to be central to that generally unrestricted authority to refrain from
prosecuting.  The imagined Section 3501 would restrict prosecutorial discretion
by compelling the admission of evidence that the executive branch believes
should not be used.
The structural presumption of independent executive authority to control
prosecutorial practice should not fall away for purposes of delimiting the
bounds of the non-enforcement power simply because Congress has identified a
single practice over which it wishes to assert final authority.  After all, Congress
would not be engaged in substantive criminal law definition in enacting the Sec-
tion 3501.  Rather, it would be engaged in the regulation of federal prosecuto-
87. See Heckler v Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).
88. It bears emphasis that the President’s asserted authority to disregard a statutory direction con-
cerning the exercise of his prosecutorial discretion would, in the context anticipated here, not flow from
a broad-based assertion of executive authority.  The President’s asserted authority emanates from the
conviction he has reached regarding the substantive constitutional limitations that the Fifth Amend-
ment places on the admission of unwarned statements of the type that were at issue in Miranda.  His
authority to assert that substantive constitutional judgment in the face of a contrary statutory command
has weight because the statutory command proposes to direct the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
Thus, it is the conjunction of a substantive constitutional conviction and the exercise of a function—the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion—that the constitutional structure presumes to be within the Presi-
dent’s control that forms the basis for his authority to disregard a congressional enactment.  Neither the
substantive constitutional judgment nor the fact that the statute purports to direct the exercise of pre-
sumptively unfettered prosecutorial discretion would, standing alone, suffice to justify the exercise of
the non-enforcement power that is contemplated here.  This distinction is sometimes lost in the course
of defenses of the President’s prosecutorial discretion.  Cf. Brief of Benjamin R. Civiletti, Dickerson v.
United States, No. 99-5525, 2000 WL 122082, at *7-16 (Jan. 28, 2000) (blurring this distinction at vari-
ous points).
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rial practices.  Congress has not purported to exercise its Article I powers to de-
clare any particular conduct by private parties unlawful; it has instead acted, in
adopting the hypothesized Section 3501, against the President’s exercise of en-
forcement discretion directly.  It is precisely with respect to decisions concern-
ing how substantive criminal offenses should be prosecuted, rather than what
conduct should be deemed criminal, over which the President is presumed to
possess a measure of independent structural authority.  A single congressional
enactment hardly seems sufficient to support a conclusion that a presidential
judgment as to the constitutionality of a prosecutorial practice should be given
no weight under our constitutional structure. 89
These cases are each distinguishable from the third case in which the Presi-
dent would be hard pressed to conclude that he possesses anything akin to the
kind of exclusive constitutional interpretive authority Jefferson had identified.
Suppose Congress passes legislation that requires the Administration to prom-
ulgate more onerous business regulations on optometrists than opticians.  The
President may be convinced that such differential regulation is the consequence
solely of private interest lobbying or corruption and is utterly arbitrary.  The
President would certainly have authority to institute investigations of such cor-
ruption (and even to give priority to such investigations because of his constitu-
tional concerns), or to veto the statute prior to its enactment.  On the approach
set forth here, it is doubtful, though, that he would be well-situated to argue
that he possessed the constitutional authority to decline to enforce the statute
on constitutional grounds.
The Supreme Court would probably uphold the statute, and resulting regu-
lations, against private challenge.90  More importantly, the President does not
possess shared, let alone independent, constitutional authority to make judg-
ments as to the needs for such commercial legislation in the way that he pos-
sesses general authority over the military or criminal prosecutorial decisions.
His job is the more ministerial one of implementing those commercial policy
judgments that Congress has made.
The analysis set forth above also provides a basis for justifying the presiden-
tial decisions that have been undertaken to frustrate the implementation of
congressional statutes on the ground that they impermissibly infringe executive
branch prerogatives.  A key justification for the President’s longstanding asser-
tion of a broader non-enforcement power with respect to statutes that infringe
89. The line between the definition of a substantive criminal offense, over which Congress may be
presumed to have superior structural authority, and the manner in which such substantive offenses
should be prosecuted, is not obvious in all instances.  As recent literature has pointed out, the line is
blurring.  See William J Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795 (1998); William J.
Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure & Criminal Justice, 107 YALE  L.J. 1
(1997).  As a consequence, a President, for example, may contend that the differential substantive
regulation of seemingly equivalent drug offenses is actually a regulation of prosecutorial discretion it-
self.  At the limit, however, it remains meaningful to distinguish between a statutory regulation of pri-
vate conduct and a statutory regulation of an executive’s manner of prosecuting such conduct.
90. See supra text accompanying notes 19-20, 40-42 (discussing application of rational basis review
to such a statute).
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on executive prerogatives directly, as occurs in classic separation of powers con-
frontations between the President and Congress, has been that non-
enforcement tends to render such disputes justiciable.91  It is more likely, how-
ever, that the assertions of an expanded non-enforcement power in these con-
texts arises from the President’s own assessment that he is at least as well-
positioned as Congress to adjudge the scope of his constitutionally vested pow-
ers.  That non-enforcement renders such cases justiciable is simply an incidental
consequence.
To the extent the President’s structural assessment is sound in these cases,
justiciability quite properly is not of foremost concern.  Indeed, if one reads
presidential signing statements, one finds them replete with what amount to
declarations that various incursions on presidential authority, in the form of re-
strictions on the foreign affairs or appointments powers, will be treated as
precatory.92  Such assertions are made even though the President is aware that
no justiciable dispute is likely to arise from such treatment, and even though, of-
ten times, the substantive constitutional claim that underlies such treatment is
itself far from settled as a matter of Supreme Court doctrine.
Even if the President concludes that both branches are better positioned
than the Court to resolve the substantive constitutional question at issue, and
even if the President decides that he should at least possess an interpretive
authority over that question that is equivalent to Congress’s, the case might still
be made for a blanket justiciability constraint on the non-enforcement power.
It might be argued that the President’s interpretation of the scope of the execu-
tive’s interpretive authority within the constitutional structure is at bottom a le-
gal one concerning the separation of powers.  Thus, one could agree that Con-
gress should be permitted to contest the interpretation in a court of law.
Accordingly, it might be contended that even if the dispute that the Court
should be called upon to resolve is only the second-order, structural dispute
concerning the proper allocation of interpretive authority between the
branches, the President should still consider himself bound to ensure that the
Court has the opportunity to make that determination.
V
RESOLVING INTER-BRANCH DISPUTES OVER INTERPRETIVE AUTHORITY
Having come this far, it is tempting to conclude that justiciability cannot be
a constraint on the non-enforcement power because the second-order, struc-
tural question of relative interpretive authority is itself a political question over
which the Court would not have decisionmaking authority.  One could argue
that the question meets the criteria of a political question.93  The scope of the
91. 18 Op. Off. Leg. Counsel at 201.
92. See, e.g., Federal Election Commission v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F. 3d 821, 824-25
(1993) (citing such signing statements).
93. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 96-107 (2d ed. 1988).
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authority to decline to enforce a statute that the President believes to be uncon-
stitutional is arguably textually committed by virtue of the Take Care Clause.
Resolution of the question would also require the Court to resolve delicate in-
ter-branch disputes.
Whatever superficial appeal such a claim might have, it will not ultimately
suffice to resolve the difficulty.  It would be a cheat to conclude otherwise.  The
dispute between Congress and the President over the scope of the non-
enforcement power is ultimately of a piece with separation of powers contests
generally.  It is a dispute over the institutional prerogatives of each branch.  It is
quite clear that the Court is more than willing to adjudicate such disputes, even
when, as Myers v. United States94 shows, the constitutional claim turns in part on
the meaning of the Take Care Clause.95
In adjudicating these disputes over institutional power, the Court does not
purport to leave it to the executive branch to conclude that a statute is unconsti-
tutional.  As was mentioned above, in disputes between the branches, the Court
does purport to be performing the strongest form of its settlement function.  In-
sofar as one grants that the branches are to be bound by Supreme Court deci-
sions in circumstances when the Court intends them to be so bound, the resolu-
tion of a separation of powers controversy between the branches is as final as it
gets.  Thus, it would be a mistake to argue that a dispute of the kind at issue
here is one that by nature is a political question or would not actually settle the
inter-branch dispute.
The classic separation of powers disputes, however, do not come to the
Court directly and nakedly as disputes between the President and Congress.
They come to the Court through claims by private persons or independent insti-
tutional actors who contend that the constitutional structure was intended to
allocate power between the branches in a manner that would be protective of
their interests.  More importantly, they come to the Court through claims by
private persons or independent institutional actors who are armed with the
statutory authority to make such claims to the Court.
In Myers, the effect of the President asserting his constitutional prerogatives
was to terminate the employment of an officer who then sought a remedy for
the right that he had lost by virtue of his dismissal.  His claim, however, was not
simply one of constitutional right.  It was a claim for back pay in the court of
claims, which presumably rested on a statutory right to make such a claim.96  It is
not clear, in other words, that barring some due process concern the plaintiff
had any personal constitutional right to make the constitutional claim that
proved decisive.  Similarly, in INS v. Chadha,97 the separation of powers contro-
versy arose because an immigrant contended that the separation of powers pro-
94. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
95. See id. at 117 (relying on the Take Care Clause in part).
96. See id. at 107-08.
97. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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tected  his interest in not being deported, and he had been afforded a statutory
right to make such a claim.98
There is no doubt that individuals should not be categorically barred consti-
tutionally from challenging in court the accommodation that the branches may
have reached as to the scope of their respective authority.  It would be a mis-
take to conclude, however, that we need such disputes to be resolved in court
solely for the sake of clarifying each branch’s understanding of the scope of its
own authority.  They are resolved in court for the benefit of the private parties
or independent institutional actors who have been armed with causes of action
by Congress for the purpose of permitting them to secure their statutorily con-
ferred entitlements.  They are, in this respect, statutory, rather than constitu-
tional suitors absent some independent constitutional cause of action, such as
may be secured by the demands of due process, the First Amendment, habeas
corpus, or some other personal right that the constitution itself may be under-
stood to confer.
This point is significant.  If the judicial resolution of inter-branch disputes
were predicated solely on an argument about the need to preserve the institu-
tional interests of the branches, it would be odd to rely on case-by-case adjudi-
cation of private disputes for their resolution.  It would make far more sense to
have the branches simply request the Court to supply an opinion and be done
with it.  So long as the Supreme Court’s doctrine is to be a guide for the scope
of the non-enforcement power, however, it is quite clear that this option is not
available.  Separation of powers questions are often adjudicated in the courts,
and their resolution undoubtedly has the consequence of defining the scope of
the powers of the respective political branches.  This incidental consequence
should not be mistaken for a motivating cause.  The primary function of adjudi-
cated separation of powers controversies, as Article III’s case or controversy
requirement makes clear, is to resolve claims of right, statutorily granted or in-
dependently conferred by the Constitution, by individuals.99
The separation of powers dispute that arises when the President declines to
enforce a statute on constitutional grounds, and thereby renders the contro-
versy non-justiciable, is, therefore, necessarily of a different order than those
separation of powers disputes that have reached the Court.  No person or insti-
tution other than the legislature has been legally harmed by the resolution of
the power struggle between the President and the Congress or else the case
would have been justiciable.  The dispute is in this respect internal, though ob-
viously not of exclusive interest, to the two branches in a way that justiciable
separation of powers disputes are not.
For that reason, it would be appropriate for these matters to be handled in
the same way that other internal separation of powers disputes are handled—
through the to and fro of political struggle.  A typical method of resolving such
98. Arguably, the Constitution, pursuant to the habeas corpus clause, required that such judicial
review be available.  See Suspension and Supremacy, Jurisdiction and Judicial Power: Habeas Corpus
After AEDPA and IIRIRA, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 695 (1998).
99. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
BARRON_FMT2.DOC 11/14/00  10:34 AM
Page 61: Winter/Spring 2000]NON-ENFORCEMENT POWER 101
rough the to and fro of political struggle.  A typical method of resolving such in-
ternal inter-branch disputes is to make constitutional litigation an option of last
resort, rather than routine course.  The clearest example of this practice of ex-
tra-judicial resolution may be found in the disputes between the President and
Congress over claims of executive privilege.  These disputes occasionally reach
the courts, though none has reached the Supreme Court, but it is expected that
they will do so only at the end of a fairly significant degree of inter-branch ne-
gotiation and wrangling.100  Professor Johnsen elsewhere has well described the
practice of accommodation that structures such disputes.101  She explains that it
serves to permit the two branches to move from typically absolutist positions to
more moderate ones as threats and counter-threats mount.  Sometimes, moreo-
ver, the negotiations even have the quality of productive exchanges.102  It would
be wrong to idealize this approach to resolution,103 but it would equally wrong to
presume that it would best be cured through increased litigation.
The accommodation model seems particularly apt here.  Except in rare cir-
cumstances, a presidential decision not to enforce a measure will itself often
represent only the opening gambit in a complicated political negotiation.  It will
rarely have the degree of finality about it that a decision to enforce would have.
The dispute over Section 567 is a good example of this process.  The President
asserted that he would enforce the statute so as to occasion a justiciable contro-
versy, but he did not actually proceed to terminate any military personnel.  His
delay was of sufficient length to permit Congress to revisit the constitutional
question, and, eventually, to repeal the provision.  In this respect, the President
could even be said to have exercised the non-enforcement power.  Had the
President actually terminated some employees, and had the case gone to court
and the statute been upheld under deferential review, it is far less certain that a
subsequent repeal would have occurred. So long as no employee had been fired,
the President could seek a compromise with the Congress.  If negotiations with
the Congress broke down, the President would then still have been able to en-
force the measure, thereby occasioning a justiciable controversy over its consti-
tutionality.  A judicial decision to uphold the statute would not at that point be
inconsistent with the President’s own constitutional judgment; it would instead
reflect the very deference to Congress that the President himself, in the end, de-
cided to afford.
To be sure, in some sense, every assertion of the non-enforcement power
imposes some burdens on private persons in a way that not every inter-branch
fight over executive privilege will.  A victim’s family who sees an accused let go
because a confession was excluded has arguably been harmed by a presidential
decision to decline to enforce Section 3501. A member of the Armed Forces
100. See SHANE & BRUFF, supra note 74, at 182-208.
101. See Dawn Johnsen, Executive Privilege Since United States v. Nixon: Issues of the Motivation &
Accommodation, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1127 (1999).
102. See id. at 1139-40.
103. See Strauss, supra note 72, at 124 (criticizing the notion that inter-branch struggle is beneficial).
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who claims to be at greater risk of acquiring an infectious disease arguably has
been harmed by a presidential decision to decline to enforce Section 567.  A
statute that grants funds to churches in connection with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation’s efforts to stop hate crimes clearly confers direct, tangible bene-
fits on private parties who would be deprived of those benefits if the President
were to conclude that the Establishment Clause bans the provision of such
funds.  All of these injuries would at least arguably constitute “injury in fact”
under the technical law of standing, and therefore suffice to permit a plaintiff
with a cause of action to bring suit challenging the President—if only Congress
were to confer such a cause of action.104
It bears emphasis that it would not be wrong in principle for Congress to
conclude that the statutory beneficiaries have been harmed by non-enforcement
in a manner sufficiently severe as to entitle them to a cause of action.  A conse-
quence of making all non-enforcement disputes justiciable through the recogni-
tion or creation of new causes of action, however, would be to transfer control
of the inter-branch struggle over relative interpretive authority into a case of
individual right to be resolved in court at the insistence of a private party.  The
transformation of inter-branch disputes over the scope of the non-enforcement
power into individual claims for entitlements would have the perhaps unin-
tended effect of precluding the branches from engaging in a form of extra-
judicial dispute resolution that is familiar in the separation of powers context.
It would also have the direct effect of transferring questions of the President’s
freedom of action from the political arena to the judicial arena, where private
parties would have the authority to police the bounds of presidential enforce-
ment discretion.  It would be quite difficult to construct a cause of action that
would permit such private policing while cabining it in a manner that would not
significantly intrude upon the President’s exercise of regular enforcement dis-
cretion.  At a minimum, the courts should be wary of implying a cause of action
that could permit the inter-branch dispute to be resolved by the courts at the in-
sistence of a private party.  In addition, Congress and the President should not
be misled into concluding either that the non-enforcement dispute is one that,
in principle, really concerns individual rights rather than the separation of pow-
ers, or that separation of powers disputes must be resolved either in court or not
at all.
The need for analytical clarity on this point is important because it is not
clear that the constitutional scheme would be better if a court were called upon
to resolve more inter-branch disputes over interpretive authority.  The cases
104. See William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L. J. 221, 233 (1988).  The fact that
there are real persons who may claim to be adversely affected by the President’s decision to decline to
enforce a statute should not be obscured by these technical rules of federal jurisdiction.  The President
must consider these claims in reaching his substantive constitutional judgment.  Of course, these costs
of non-enforcement should not count conclusively against its exercise, for the President, insofar as he
identifies them, must still weigh them against the costs to his understanding of the Constitution that
would follow from enforcement.
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emerging out of the Clinton v. Jones105 litigation may be problematic less for
their substantive holdings than for the fact that they have been decided.  It may
be that the constitutional structure is best understood to be intentionally
opaque on many questions of relative authority between the branches.  A con-
sequence of this opacity is that the practical distribution of entitlements that the
Constitution confers serves to structure accommodations between the branches
even in the absence of judicial resolution.
There also would be structural costs to increasing the judiciary’s role in re-
solving such disputes.  The sensitive questions of interpretive authority that dis-
putes over the non-enforcement power raise would likely be resolved in a cate-
gorical manner merely by virtue of the Court’s own institutional limitations.
Such categorical resolution, as has been suggested, might itself be unfortunate
because it would preclude a conception of constitutionalism that rests on
shared, rather categorical, interpretive authority.  In addition, however much it
might be the case that the Court should limit its decision solely to an analysis of
the relative interpretive authority of the competing branches, it is quite likely
that in taking such a case, the Court would venture to inquire into the substan-
tive assessments of each branch’s decision.  That result would extend the
Court’s decisional authority in a manner that neither branch should prefer.
There may be particular benefits to extra-judicial, inter-branch negotiation
in circumstances where legislation was passed in connection with omnibus leg-
islation and therefore received little sustained consideration by either branch.
Such negotiation may cause one or the other branch to change positions on the
substantive constitutional question, as happened in connection with Section 567,
which Congress repealed following the President’s announcement that he be-
lieved it to be unconstitutional.  Negotiation may also lead the branches to
reach accommodations on ameliorative administrative or legislative action that
no court could order as a remedy.
More broadly, much of the recent literature for limiting judicial ambition in
constitutional interpretation proceeds from an argument that is concerned less
with the legitimacy of courts than the costs that judicial review exacts upon the
capabilities of extra-judicial interpreters.  The argument is one about the conse-
quences, indeed, the difficulties, of attempting to practice constitutional self-
government in the shadow of judges.  It is an argument that a system of judicial
review necessarily affects the capacity of non-judicial actors to perform consti-
tutional self-government, and that such a system affects them, and by extension,
the practice itself, adversely.  Rather than constraining and disciplining non-
judicial actors to adhere to constitutional limitations, to forswear the exercise of
arbitrary power, such a system conditions them to forswear constitutionalism
itself, to perceive it as technical lawyers’ work, divorced from their own lives,
105. 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
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something that is done to them rather than something that is created, con-
structed, or ever applied by them.106
This critique suggests that judicial review silences others from engaging in a
variation of the current court-centered practice of constitutionalism that we
would prefer if only we had the courage to permit it to flourish.  Or perhaps,
more modestly, it suggests at least that judicial review silences others from en-
gaging in a variation of that practice that, whether attractive or not, a proper
understanding of constitutional self-government should commit us to prefer.
This critique is relevant to the question at issue even if one rejects its more
sweeping implications.  If we make justiciability the key constraint in the Presi-
dent’s non-enforcement power, we are likely to ensure that the constitutional
argumentation that results will be confined to the courts, and the briefs that are
filed in them.
It must be acknowledged, of course, that one can get carried away with vi-
sions of Presidents soberly consulting the Constitution to decide what must be
done.  In many instances, the constitutional question will depend in large part
on technical lawyers’ questions that no President can be expected to master,
and indeed, perhaps, that, no President should even be expected to master.
That said, the more that the non-enforcement power is understood as one that
operates without respect to a justiciability constraint, the more likely it is that
the constitutional decision to be made will be one that rests on a judgment of
high policy rather than technical legal evaluation.  That is yet another virtue of
a conception of the non-enforcement power that treats it as an exercise of po-
litical authority rather than judicial agency.107
VI
CONCLUSION
The President quite clearly possesses a non-enforcement power in those cir-
cumstances where Supreme Court precedent invalidating the relevant statute
appears to be directly controlling, if there is no good faith distinction or reason
for departing from the principle of stare decisis.  But what of the many instances
in which a President’s constitutional conviction finds no such validation in
precedent?
It is important, in such cases, to pay attention to the practical consequences
that follow from non-enforcement decisions.  It is important as well to develop
a way of thinking about the exercise of the non-enforcement power that is re-
106. See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 10-14, 57-71
(1998).
107. Precisely because the type of judgments to be made under the conception of the non-
enforcement power set forth here concern questions of high policy—what are the effects of an exclu-
sionary rule, how necessary is a rule precluding HIV-positive personnel from serving in the military?—
they should be made only by constitutional actors who are positioned to resolve such questions of high
policy.  Here, I would think that the President and the Attorney General, in consultation with such
other constitutional officers as they deemed necessary, would qualify.
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spectful of a constitutional structure that divides authority among institutions of
differing capacities.  There are clearly occasions when resolution of a constitu-
tional dispute between the political branches over interpretive authority should
be performed by a court.  An emphasis on justiciability, however, may distort
our reasons for thinking this to be the case.
It would be wrong to assume that judicial review is necessary in order to ob-
tain a  “correct” resolution of the substantive constitutional question over which
the legislature and the executive disagree.  Constitutional doctrine often does
not supply that kind of answer in the face of a judgment by a competing branch
that a certain course of governmental conduct is unconstitutional.  The provi-
sion of more information to the courts, therefore, will not necessarily lead us
closer to the truth.  In some respects, an assumption that the provision of more
information to the courts will generate better answers will only lead us further
away from an exploration of the ways in which the constitutional structure is
premised on a more complicated understanding of constitutional meaning.
That more complicated understanding does not assume political actors
should simply assert their constitutional convictions as they see fit, and then
duke it out in a fight to the death for final authority.  As we have seen, the very
reasons that suggest that the Court intends for political actors to exercise inde-
pendent constitutional judgment suggests as well that each of the political
branches owes a measure of deference to the constitutional vision of the other.
The areas of political action delimited by Justice Jackson as making up the zone
of twilight, in which executive power, though not constitutionally vested as ex-
clusive, is nonetheless properly understood to exist independent of congres-
sional authorization, point the way to structuring the content of inter-political-
branch deference.  Justice Jackson’s metaphor helps to delimit areas in which a
President can act upon his own constitutional convictions with confidence that
his constitutional vision is entitled to weight.  The metaphor serves to identify
those areas in which the President is presumed to be structurally competent to
act on the basis of his own, independent judgment.
It is important to emphasize that the decisional areas within the zone of twi-
light, limited though they may be, happen to track some of our most recent and
important non-enforcement dilemmas.  They should not be quickly dismissed,
therefore, as mere “special,” and thus unimportant, cases.  The tendency to
relegate such cases to a special class involving executive expertise makes them
an exception to a general rule of presidential deference to the constitutional
convictions of others, and only that.  The existence of the contemporary non-
enforcement dilemmas, such as those concerning Sections 567 and 3501, how-
ever, should warn us away from a tact that marginalizes such cases from the
front and center of the non-enforcement discussion.  These contemporary di-
lemmas should suggest, instead, that it is precisely in the zone of twilight that
the non-enforcement dilemma is the most real and vexing.  In the large zone in
which the respective authority of the executive and legislative branches is rela-
tively clear (the debate over the non-enforcement power itself notwithstand-
BARRON_FMT2.DOC 11/14/00  10:34 AM
106 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 63: Nos. 1 & 2
ing), it is far less likely that a President will feel sufficiently confident to substi-
tute his constitutional vision for that of Congress.  It is rather in the shadow that
twilight creates that a President may be expected to take action that he quite
uncontroversially would otherwise decline to even contemplate.
It is important, finally, to emphasize that it would be wrong to assume that
the only effective way to resolve the inter-branch dispute that executive non-
enforcement may occasion is through constitutional litigation.  Inter-branch
disputes are susceptible to judicial resolution, but there is no requirement that a
court supply resolution in cases in which no private party has been legally
harmed.  Nor is it clear that it would be wise to expand our conception of legal
harm so as to make such inter-branch disputes routinely subject to judicial
resolution.  As the nature of the dispute over the non-enforcement power is, in
a deep sense, an internal one over the scope of interpretive authority, litigation
should be a dispute resolution option of last, rather than first, resort.
A President will often act wisely in enforcing a statute notwithstanding con-
stitutional misgivings.  There are practical reasons, sounding in a proper under-
standing of the constitutional relationship between the executive and legislative
branches, for permitting the Court to pass on the constitutionality of statutes
even when the branches do not see the Constitution in the same way.  The
judgment as to whether to seek such judicial resolution will often not be com-
pelled, however, by limitations on the capacity of non-judicial actors, such as
the President, to discern constitutional meaning.  Indeed, a commitment to en-
suring that the full meaning of constitutional limitations can be uncovered will
sometimes justify the exercise of the non-enforcement power even though such
action will preclude judicial review.
